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NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite successful elections and a lasting military 
ceasefire, Nepal’s peace process is facing its most se-
vere tests yet. Major issues remain unresolved: there 
is no agreement on the future of the two armies, very 
little of the land seized during the conflict has been 
returned, and little progress has been made writing a 
new constitution. Challenges to the basic architecture 
of the 2006 peace deal are growing from all sides. 
Key political players, particularly the governing Mao-
ists and the opposition Nepali Congress (NC), need to 
rebuild consensus on the way forward or face a public 
backlash. International supporters of Nepal must tar-
get assistance and political pressure to encourage the 
parties to face the threats to peace. 
The April 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections 
delivered a convincing victory for the Maoists but left 
them short of an outright majority. The major parties 
promised to continue working together but the NC, 
which came second, refused to join the government 
that was eventually installed in August 2008. For all 
its weaknesses, this government is Nepal’s best hope 
but it is not living up to its promise and there are no 
viable alternatives. There can be no functional gov-
ernment without the Maoists on board, let alone any 
hope of proceeding with a constitution-writing proc-
ess in which they can wield a blocking vote. 
Yet the Maoists have not fully adjusted to democratic 
politics, nor has mainstream politics adjusted to their 
arrival. There is little unity of effort or intent among 
the governing coalition partners. Opponents of the 
Maoists talk up the prospects of a government col-
lapse. Conservative wings of both the NC and the 
moderate Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marx-
ist-Leninist), the largest coalition partner, have been 
reinvigorated. In the face of continued instability, 
armed protest and burgeoning identity-based move-
ments, the immediate threat to Nepal is not Maoist 
totalitarianism but a dangerous weakening of the 
state’s authority and capacity to govern. 
Maoist commitment to political pluralism is still 
highly questionable. Debate within the party – re-
named the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Mao-
ist), UCPN(M), following its merger with a smaller 
group – shows the goal of a communist “people’s re-
public” is still in place. Although leading the govern-
ment, Maoist leaders continue to threaten renewed 
revolutionary struggle and the “capture of state 
power”. Such threats have been underlined by cadres’ 
continued violent behaviour and an apparent drive to 
consolidate alternative power bases through affiliated 
organisations like trade unions. 
However, the essence of the peace process, from the 
November 2005 agreement between the CPN(M) and 
the mainstream seven-party alliance onwards, was a 
double transformation. The Maoists were to renounce 
violence and accept multiparty democracy and inter-
national human rights norms. The mainstream parties 
were to develop more inclusive and democratic inter-
nal structures and renounce the bad behaviour that 
had weakened the post-1990 exercise of democracy. 
The old politics was discredited and still faces the 
challenge of renewing itself – with the established 
parties needing to earn legitimacy.  
The Maoists have made a greater effort to change 
than other parties but their democratic transformation 
is far from complete. They should take the lead to re-
build confidence by unambiguously renouncing vio-
lence and reaffirming their commitment to political 
pluralism. The Nepali Congress is in a state of organ-
isational and political disarray. The Maoists’ coalition 
partners also face internal power struggles and tough 
policy decisions. In short, the democratic alternatives 
to the Maoists are alarmingly weak: the other parties 
suffer from exclusiveness and weakened support and 
offer no fresh options to complete the peace process. 
The state of public security and law and order is wor-
rying. Although the incidents that draw most attention 
– killings, explosions and shutdowns – have all de-
creased since peaks in the first half of 2008, there is 
little sense of stability. Districts across the Tarai, from 
the eastern and central heartland of the Madhesi 
movement to the far west, continue to be plagued by 
insecurity and, in many areas, a near collapse of gov-
ernance and policing. While the police are demoral-
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ised, the Nepalese Army (NA) remains a law unto it-
self, resisting both democratic control and investiga-
tion of alleged war crimes during the conflict.  
International actors, India, the UN and Nepal’s long-
standing donors, have played important roles in pro-
moting peace and now need to maintain consistent 
pressure on all parties to live up to their commit-
ments. Allowing parts of the peace agreements to drift 
into abeyance will put the entire process at risk. The 
common struggle against the monarchy was not the 
sole foundation for the original negotiations, nor were 
the initial talks based solely on parties’ self-interest. 
The search for peace was a powerful, and popularly 
backed, rationale. All sides knew that the deal de-
ferred some important, difficult topics but they were 
right in opting to tackle them within a peace process, 
however contentious, rather than allowing the pursuit 
of a perfect deal to threaten a return to war. Despite 
significant political differences, this spirit of consen-
sus underpinned a remarkable peaceful transition. 
Nepal’s political leaders must urgently rebuild this 
collaborative spirit and recommit themselves to see-
ing through the process. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and 
Constitutional Processes: 
1. Reestablish a basic consensus on completing the 
peace process and set up the necessary mecha-
nisms, for example by: 
a) forming an appropriate political coordination 
mechanism, such as an inter-party committee 
or high-level commission, to set priorities, re-
solve disputes and keep the process on track; 
b) establishing an independent monitoring body, 
with nationwide presence, convening capacity 
and neutral but respected leadership, to observe 
and report on all parties’ adherence to their 
peace commitments and provide impartial, fac-
tual updates on shortcomings;  
c) seriously considering the possible benefits of 
international technical and/or secretarial sup-
port to such a body; and 
d) ensuring the newly constituted Army Integra-
tion Special Committee (AISC) promptly starts 
substantive discussions on integration and re-
habilitation of Maoist army combatants. 
2. Ensure the constitutional process moves forward by: 
a) adhering to the promises of consensus and co-
operation set out in all agreements from No-
vember 2005 until the June 2008 multiparty 
commitment; 
b) recognising the primacy of fulfilling promises 
made to the Nepali people as a whole by mak-
ing a fresh public commitment to this effect; 
c) promptly activating the CA committees and 
ensuring they seek public input in their areas of 
competence and maintain transparency in their 
discussions; and 
d) making every effort to adhere to the foreshort-
ened timetable but avoiding the temptation to 
meet deadlines by short-circuiting meaningful 
debate. 
To the Government of Nepal: 
3. Focus on peace process implementation by: 
a) setting up the commissions and committees 
specified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) with as broad participation as feasible; 
b) ensuring decision-making bodies have capa-
ble, senior representation and are adequately 
empowered, and administratively supported, to 
fulfil their mandates; and 
c) even if independent monitoring mechanisms 
are established, using government systems to 
report regularly to the cabinet on progress or 
problems. 
4. Set clear peace process and development priori-
ties by: 
a) clarifying and restating, with the support of all 
coalition members, the key goals of the gov-
ernment’s September 2008 statement of poli-
cies and programs; 
b) shaping the agenda for donor support by de-
veloping clear requests for bilateral and multi-
lateral assistance, and making the most of 
technical assistance; and 
c) improving public communications, framing 
realistic timetables to manage expectations and 
building public confidence in the peace process 
by highlighting success stories. 
5. Deliver tangible improvements in the weak law 
and order situation, by: 
a) supporting the work of the home ministry’s 
public security task force and seriously consid-
ering its recommendations, if appropriate request-
ing international support to implement them; 
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b) cracking down through non-lethal methods on 
illegal disruptive protests, while guaranteeing 
the basic right to strike and peaceful protest; 
c) keeping major roads and other infrastructure 
secure and well patrolled, as well as providing 
more intensive, community-oriented policing 
in unstable areas; and 
d) strictly controlling the illegal activities of party 
youth wings, in particular their unlawful efforts 
to fulfil parallel policing functions. 
6. Do not use the stability of the peace process as an 
excuse for ignoring pressing calls for justice, by: 
a) ending the culture of impunity by pursuing in-
vestigations and prosecutions of all serious al-
leged crimes; 
b) empowering police to resist pressure to refuse 
to file cases or drop investigations and take ac-
tion against individuals and institutions seeking 
to pervert the course of justice; 
c) bringing draft bills on disappearances and the 
truth and reconciliation commission into law 
only after consulting victims, experts and the 
general public, meeting international standards 
and subjecting legislation to parliamentary ap-
proval rather than using ordinances to bypass 
debate; 
d) requesting appropriate international technical 
assistance for investigations; and 
e) responding substantively to the UN Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights re-
ports on serious and systematic human rights 
abuses during the conflict, by pursuing criminal 
investigations and prosecutions of those named 
as allegedly responsible for repeated, grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law. 
7. Improve the management of state security forces, by: 
a) bringing the NA under meaningful democratic 
control, including establishing parliamentary 
oversight, fully auditing expenditure and de-
veloping the constitutionally mandated work 
plan for democratisation of the army; 
b) making the recently constituted National De-
fence Council functional, providing it with se-
cretariat support and using it as a forum to feed 
professional expertise into the political deci-
sion-making process; 
c) building the functions and capacity of the de-
fence ministry and embarking, if appropriate, 
with international support, on the joint adminis-
trative training of military and civilian officers; 
d) ending the obstruction by both state and non-
state security forces, in particular the NA, Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Nepal Police, 
of investigations into crimes committed during 
the conflict; and 
e) avoiding politicisation of promotions, transfers 
and operational matters, perhaps by empowering 
a multi-party body such as the AISC, in the case 
of the army, to scrutinise important decisions. 
To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): 
8. Start the process of restoring confidence by un-
equivocally reaffirming the ceasefire and CPA 
conditions on ceasing all political violence and 
the commitment to political pluralism, in word 
and deed. 
9. Fulfil the prime minister’s promise to put the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under the con-
trol of the AISC and end the practice of PLA 
commanders speaking publicly on sensitive po-
litical issues.  
10. Fulfil outstanding peace process commitments, in 
particular: 
a) demilitarising the Young Communist League 
(YCL) and vacating seized premises it cur-
rently occupies; 
b) promptly discharging under-age and otherwise 
disqualified combatants from the cantonments, 
cooperating with the government and interna-
tional agencies on rehabilitation programs; 
c) respecting press freedom, human rights and 
political pluralism; 
d) returning property seized during the conflict; and 
e) cooperating with investigations and prosecu-
tions of alleged crimes committed during the 
conflict and ceasefire periods. 
To the Major Established Parliamentary Parties: 
11. Make efforts to win back popular legitimacy by: 
a) reforming party structures with serious steps 
towards internal democracy and increased re-
sponsiveness to popular demands; 
b) taking urgent steps to improve the representa-
tion of women and marginalised ethnic, caste 
and regional groups at all levels of party struc-
tures; and 
c) considering, at the individual party level or 
collectively, a renewed public commitment to 
the promises for changed behaviour embodied 
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in the 2005 twelve-point agreement accompa-
nied by a clear program of action. 
To the International Community, in particular 
India, China, the U.S., EU, UN and Donors: 
12. Recognise that the peace process is fragile and 
incomplete and maintain a commitment to high-
level political engagement, including: 
a) strongly warning the government and political 
parties that relations will be damaged by any 
breakdown in the peace process or failure to 
control political violence and underlining 
strong international expectations of consensus 
and cooperation; 
b) calling for a public and definitive Maoist re-
nunciation of violence; 
c) pressuring all parties to adhere to the CPA and 
other agreements and to have debates within 
that framework; and 
d) urging investigations into the worst alleged 
conflict abuses and offering technical support 
as appropriate. 
13. Recognise that completing the peace and constitutional 
processes is an essential basis for all development 
programs and target assistance appropriately, by: 
a) developing programs to buttress public confi-
dence in the peace process, for example by en-
couraging the government to focus on creating 
jobs and opportunities for youth; 
b) maintaining a strong emphasis on human 
rights, political pluralism and conflict resolu-
tion at the heart of all policies, including devel-
opment aid and military cooperation; and 
c) supporting the government’s Nepal Peace Trust 
Fund, with appropriate emphasis on transparent 
accounting and fiduciary risk but without ear-
marking, as well as the UN Peace Fund. 
14. Recognise that delay in reforming the security 
sector compromises all development by draining 
resources and undermining political progress, by: 
a) pushing for concrete, step-by-step progress on 
building democratic control of the security sector; 
b) providing technical assistance, as requested, to 
parliamentary oversight mechanisms as well as 
the ministry of defence; and 
c) pressing the Nepalese Army to accept civilian 
oversight and assist in training and capacity 
building of civilian and military officers. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 19 February 2009
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NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s peace process has made remarkable progress 
but now faces its most severe obstacles.1 Although the 
roadmap set out in the November 2006 Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement (CPA) was disrupted by dis-
agreements between the major parties and external 
challenges such as the Madhesi movement, the Con-
stituent Assembly (CA) elections were held success-
fully in April 2008. The transition to a republic was 
peaceful and the unprecedented diversity of the new 
CA raised hopes of more inclusive politics. The elec-
tion of a president and, in August 2008, the formation 
of a Maoist-led government were both delayed by 
wrangling but nevertheless took place.2 These steps 
were helped by a June agreement between the major 
parties, although few of its provisions have been im-
plemented.3 
 
 
1 On the process so far see past Crisis Group reporting: on 
the CA election, Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, Nepal’s 
Election and Beyond¸ 2 April 2008 and the companion post-
election Asia Reports N°155, Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful 
Revolution? and N°156, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, 3 
July 2008; on the various peace agreements: Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Par-
ties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005; Asia Report Nº126, 
Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, 15 December 
2006; Asia Briefing N°68, Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, 
28 September 2007; and Asia Briefing N°72, Nepal: Peace 
Postponed, 18 December 2007; and on the constitutional 
process: Asia Reports N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005; and N°128, 
Nepal’s Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. Full 
Nepali translations of all reports and briefings from 2007 
onwards are available at www.crisisgroup.org/nepali. 
2 Following its 13 January 2009 merger with the Unity Cen-
tre (Masal), the CPN(M) was renamed the Unified Commu-
nist Party of Nepal (Maoist), UCPN(M). This report uses 
“CPN(M)” for the pre-unification and “UCPN(M)” for the 
post-unification parties. 
3 The constitutional revisions proposed in the agreement 
were implemented with the 15 July 2008 fifth amendment to 
the interim constitution but most other promises remain un-
fulfilled. “Agreement between the political parties to amend 
the Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 
June 2008, unofficial English translation at www.un.org.np. 
The new government passed an ambitious budget, 
made positive steps in international relations and re-
stored some order in the administration – not least by 
holding regular cabinet meetings and improving deci-
sion-making. The CA carried out some of its legisla-
tive duties and also agreed its constitution-writing 
procedures, including setting a detailed timetable for 
completion of the new constitution and establishing 
thematic drafting committees. The presidency has 
been a quiet success story. With no direct precedents 
to guide his behaviour, President Ram Baran Yadav 
has deftly avoided controversy and remained above 
the political fray, while also issuing public reminders 
of the need for all to work together in the national in-
terest. The Public Service Commission has been re-
constituted and there are signs that parties are close to 
consensus on creating local peace committees and lo-
cal government bodies.4 
The new government, however, has faced problems 
with its dual responsibilities as an executive and as 
guardian of the constitution-writing exercise. The dif-
ficult global economic context does not help: it is 
likely to squeeze overseas employment, reduce the 
remittances on which Nepal has come to depend and 
slow economic growth.  
This report focuses on political developments that are 
mostly taking place in Kathmandu. There is a ten-
dency for reporting on Nepal to focus on elite devel-
opments in the capital while ignoring key issues 
happening elsewhere, particularly in the Tarai flat-
lands in the south. However the peace process has be-
come an elite, Kathmandu-centred issue; indeed that 
is one of its major flaws. Past Crisis Group reports 
have examined issues in the Tarai and elsewhere and 
will return to those subjects. 
 
 
4 Minister Ram Chandra Jha vowed that local bodies would 
take shape by mid-February. The parties have agreed to allo-
cate leadership on the basis of the CA proportional represen-
tation vote, which would put the UCPN(M) in charge of 23 
districts, the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) sixteen each, the 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) five and the Tarai Madhes 
Democratic Party (TMDP), Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
(RPP) and CPN (Marxist-Leninist) two each. 
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II. CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT? 
A. WHAT’S LEFT OF THE PEACE PROCESS? 
The fundamental weaknesses of the political settle-
ment have now been exposed. The consensus underly-
ing the twelve-point agreement and CPA was based 
more on a temporary convergence of interests than on 
a deeply shared vision for reshaping Nepal. In the 
post-people’s movement period almost no attention 
was paid to confidence-building between the parties. 
The ever more insistent voices from outside the 
seven-party/Maoist fold were only listened to when 
protests or violence got them attention.  
Deferring decisions on critical areas such as the army 
and police enabled the elections to go ahead but has 
allowed the most serious disagreements to fester and 
positions to drift further apart. The election results made 
the rebuilding of a common minimum understanding 
all the more difficult. For supporters of the status quo, 
the Maoist victory was initially indigestible and lat-
terly unacceptable. As the losing parties have encour-
aged each other to view the outcome as illegitimate, 
the public mandate for change has been devalued and 
the political equations underlying the writing of the 
constitution have been called into question.5 
Decision-making remains narrowly based, exclusive 
and non-transparent. The verdict of voters has had only 
a slight significance in a political culture where estab-
lished leaders feel unchastened by electoral defeat. So 
far, there have only been nods towards public consul-
tation and participation in the constitutional process, 
although the establishment of CA subcommittees to 
 
 
5 The major observer organisations, national and interna-
tional, have published their full reports on the elections. 
Some of them add considerable detail on pre-election clashes 
and campaign irregularities and all refer to the background 
intimidation that coloured the election atmosphere. However, 
none suggests that these factors undermine the election’s 
credibility. One of the principal national organisations con-
cluded that “the Nepali people exercised their franchise in a 
joyous, festive and peaceful manner and in overwhelming 
numbers. As a result, except for some minor incidences, no 
one seriously challenged either the total outcome of the elec-
tion or the manner in which it was conducted.…[we] con-
cluded, on the basis of observations and reports received 
from its regional and district chapters, that those incidents 
[of reported violence, intimidation, unequal access to the 
media and code of conduct infractions] did not severely af-
fect the outcome of elections”. “Nepal Constituent Assembly 
Election 2008: Comprehensive Report”, National Election 
Observation Committee (NEOC), Kathmandu, August 2008, 
executive summary. 
work in this area indicates some prospect for progress. 
The difference between reaching deals and managing 
their implementation – a serious problem for the 
peace process – bears lessons for the constitution.6 
Control over the security sector remains at the heart 
of the power struggle; the impasse over the question 
of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) integration and 
the broader issues are discussed in detail below. Many 
other aspects of the peace deal remain unresolved or 
unimplemented. Apart from a few exceptions, the 
Maoists have not fulfilled their repeated promises to 
return property seized during the conflict, nor have 
they fully dismantled parallel structures.7 Local gov-
ernment is yet to be re-established, although cross-
party consensus on creating interim bodies appears 
close. Basic governance and service delivery is patchy 
at best, with only six of the 75 districts having secre-
taries posted in all village development committees. 
Most of the commissions and committees called for in 
the CPA and subsequent agreements have not been 
created.8 The state of law and order and public secu-
rity is dangerously weak, especially in the Tarai. 
 
 
6 Major elements of agreements with the United Democratic 
Madhesi Front (UDMF) and Federal Republican National 
Front (FRNF) have not been implemented. The eight-point 
agreement with the UDMF is at www.unmin.org.np/downlo 
ads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UDMF.NEP 
.pdf; an unofficial English translation is at www.unmin.org. 
np/downloads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt. 
UD MF.ENG.pdf. The five-point government-FRNF agree-
ment is at www.un min.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-03-
02-Agreement. SPA. Govt.FRNF.NEP.pdf; an unofficial 
English translation is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/key 
docs/2008-03-02-Agreement. SPA.Govt.FRNF.ENG.pdf. 
7 In June 2008 the Maoists explicitly reconfirmed their long-
standing promise to return all seized property and added a 
tight deadline: “Within 15 days, the Maoists will implement 
the first point of the agreement between the eight political 
parties of 30 March 2007, which states, ‘All property, in-
cluding all private and public houses, land, offices, factories 
and vehicles, that has been controlled by the Maoists during 
the conflict [will be] returned to the concerned individuals 
and agencies. The administration will take legal action if 
anyone obstructs and hinders the use of [such] property, in-
cluding houses, lands, factories and offices’”. “Agreement 
between the political parties to amend the Constitution and 
take forward the peace process”, 25 June 2008, Art. 4. In 
early 2009 the Maoists returned property in some three 
dozen districts, including that belonging to other party lead-
ers including former royalist prime ministers Surya Bahadur 
Thapa and Lokendra Bahadur Chand. “Sampatti phirta suru”, 
Kantipur, 3 February 2009. 
8 The June 2008 Agreement (Art. 5) promised: “During the 
course of implementing those provisions that have been 
made in [past] accords and understandings, including those 
yet to be implemented in the Comprehensive Peace Accord, 
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An increase in general unrest, mostly strikes and 
shutdowns, has severely disrupted economic activity 
and deterred new investment.9 This has been com-
pounded by a growth in militant youth wings affili-
ated to political parties.10 Most of these were set up in 
response to the Maoist Young Communist League 
(YCL), which remains a militarised organisation.11 
The release and rehabilitation of under-age and oth-
erwise disqualified combatants from PLA canton-
ments may soon get under way but is very belated.  
Impunity is rife and extends from the heart of the state 
to the activities of militant groups. There have been 
many unpunished offences in the ceasefire period. 
The most prominent violations include the Maoists’ 
abduction and murder of businessman Ram Hari 
Shrestha and the killings of at least four journalists.12 
 
 
a number of commissions will be formed within one month, 
on the basis of political understanding. These will include a 
National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, a High-Level Commission for 
Restructuring the State, a Commission to Investigate the 
Disappeared, a Commission to Study and Give Recommen-
dations on Scientific Land Reform, and the other commis-
sions as stipulated under Article 154 of the Constitution”. 
The latter include possible commissions “to safeguard and 
promote the rights and interests of different sectors of the 
country including women, Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups, 
Madhesi, disabled, labourers or farmers” although the consti-
tution states that the government “may” rather than “will” 
form them. Interim Constitution, Art. 154. 
9 The number of districts affected by shutdowns and the 
number of groups calling both strikes and shutdowns peaked 
at the start of 2008 (36 districts affected in February and sev-
enteen groups involved in January), declined dramatically by 
October (four districts affected by two groups) but surged 
again in November (eighteen districts affected by ten groups). 
“Locals”, rather than any organised grouping, were respon-
sible for most incidents (locals often blockade highways fol-
lowing incidents such as pedestrian deaths in vehicular 
accidents); the next most prolific shutdown-caller was the 
pre-election UDMF alliance. “Nepal: Total Reports of 
Bandhs/Blockades in 2008”, UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, Kathmandu, at www.un.org.np. 
10 Apart from the Maoists, the UML’s Youth Force has been 
the most active. In mid November 2008, three further parties 
formed new youth groups: the TMDP, RPP(N) and Chure 
Bhawar Rastriya Ekata Party. 
11 On 24 January 2009 the YCL was renamed the Young 
Communist Democratic League. This report retains the widely 
recognised “YCL” as most references to the organisation in-
clude the period before the name change. 
12 Since 2006, four journalists, Uma Singh, J.P. Joshi, Biren-
dra Sah and Pushkar Bahadur Shrestha, have been killed; 
Prakash Singh Thakuri has been missing since July 2007. 
The Federation of Nepali Journalists recorded 342 press 
freedom violations in 2008, including a significant escalation 
in the number of physical attacks on journalists and media 
At the same time, hundreds of other killings have 
taken place across the country, especially in the cen-
tral and eastern Tarai, although levels have declined 
since early 2008.13 The lack of any ceasefire or peace 
process monitoring mechanism has become all the 
more critical, making it easy for claims of infringe-
ments to be made without investigation or redress. 
Criminal cases against Maoist and other political 
leaders have been dropped by executive fiat, regard-
less of the seriousness of alleged offences.14 Slow 
steps towards the establishment of an investigation 
commission on enforced disappearances and the draft-
ing of more satisfactory legislation for a truth and 
reconciliation commission suggest that some progress 
on transitional justice may be possible. There has 
been little effort, however, to cultivate a national de-
bate on appropriate measures or listen to victims’ voices 
and address their pressing needs. Most significantly in 
terms of impunity, the national army’s apparent cul-
pability for systematic war crimes including abduc-
tion, torture, rape and murder has not led to any action. 
B. THE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT:  
IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER? 
The Maoists have had a mixed record in government. 
The coalition has held together and has managed the 
basics of day-to-day governance. On some fronts 
there have been unexpected, and largely uncelebrated, 
successes. Ministers’ foreign trips – especially those 
of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” 
– calmed some fears about the possible implications 
of Maoist rule. Against expectations, the government 
has dramatically boosted revenue collection, putting it 
on track to meet one of its ambitious budgetary tar-
gets.15 A voluntary declaration of income scheme to 
encourage large earners to come into the tax net has 
discomfited some businesspeople but raised signifi-
 
 
houses, prompting a February 2009 international media mis-
sion to warn that press freedom still faced a “serious threat”. 
“Nepalese media in great danger, International Press Freedom 
Mission finds”, Reporters Without Borders, 8 February 2009. 
13 See detailed statistics in Section V.B.2, “Public Security” 
below. 
14 On 23 October 2008 the government withdrew 349 crimi-
nal cases against political party cadres accused of crimes in-
cluding rape, robbery and drug smuggling. 53 of these cases 
had been registered after the signing of the CPA. 
15 The first four months of the 2008-2009 fiscal year saw 
revenue mobilisation grow by 35.4 per cent to reach Rs.33 
billion (approx. $425 million). “Revenue collection soars to 
Rs 33 billion”, nepalnews.com, 1 January 2009. 
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cant sums.16 Even as revenue has risen, however, de-
velopment expenditure has declined.17 The profes-
sionalism and good working relationship of Maoist 
Finance Minister Baburam Bhattarai and Finance Sec-
retary Rameshwor Khanal has impressed donors. “Min-
ister for minister this government is far more serious 
than the interim government”, says one diplomat. “At 
least the cabinet actually meets and tries to shape an 
agenda – it’s far too soon to write off the govern-
ment”.18 The launch of a national literacy campaign, 
provision of free maternal health services and record 
tourist arrivals suggest there is good news to report.19 
But the Maoist-led administration is already widely 
dismissed as a failure. Partly this is due to an almost 
universally hostile press and the government’s poor 
grasp of communications. But its own weaknesses are 
more to blame. The party has been strong on com-
promise and conciliatory statements but weak on de-
livery. The UCPN(M)’s commanding plurality in the 
CA has not translated into a decisive grip on power or 
a clear lead on policy. An electricity crisis, the result 
of a cumulative underinvestment for which the Mao-
ists are partially responsible (in attacking and disrupt-
ing hydropower projects during the conflict), has 
reduced supply to eight hours per day.20 This hits the 
politically influential urban middle classes hardest 
 
 
16 By the eve of the scheme’s deadline, property worth some 
Rs 3.45 billion ($45 million) had been declared, with a 10 
per cent tax paid. Milan Mani Sharma, “Self disclosures 
touch Rs 3.45b”, myrepublica.com, 10 February 2009. 
17 “Development expenditure tumbles by 23 pc”, nepal-
news.com, 20 January 2009. 
18 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
19 Gopal Sharma, “Record tourist numbers as Nepal emerges 
from civil war”, Reuters, 10 January 2009. 
20 The conflict is certainly not the only factor that has im-
peded power schemes. One former managing director of the 
Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), explained: “The pathetic 
security situation prevailing during the ten-year-old conflict 
period did indeed prevent potential private investors from 
setting up hydro plants. However, this should not have pre-
vented the government and NEA from adding new genera-
tion capacity. With each change in government, heads begin 
to roll in public enterprises, and in this manner, a new man-
aging director is appointed in NEA, not primarily on merit 
but on considerations which are at best questionable”. Ajit 
N.S. Thapa, “Extended load-shedding: symptom of deeper 
malaise”, The Himalayan Times, 19 January 2009. The fi-
nance secretary has blamed local agents, “the invisible power 
that works between foreign contractors, goods importers and 
the government for commission”, for the delays in the Kali 
Gandaki A project (initiated in 1997 but with construction 
only starting in 2004) and the Mid-Marsyangdi project 
(which came online more than three years late at the end of 
2008). “Parties accused of lacking political will”, ekanti-
pur.com, 22 January 2009. 
and adds to the pressures on the government, which 
has no options for immediate relief. 
The obstacles that a radical party working through 
traditional institutions might face were always clear – 
and well known to the Maoists from their two stints in 
the pre-election interim government. Prachanda’s ex-
cuse that governing has proved more difficult than 
expected sounds naive at best. In fact, institutions 
such as the staid bureaucracy and traditionalist judici-
ary are manageable. As successive transitions have 
illustrated, they will orient themselves to a new power 
centre if given a clear lead. Bureaucrats are as likely 
to be inspired by dedicated, professional ministers 
with vision as put off by ideological labels. Failing to 
build on this possibility reflects the Maoists’ weak-
ness in planning, and slowness to adapt to the busi-
ness of running a government, rather than bureaucrats’ 
insurmountable intransigence. 
In government, the Maoists have been more clumsy 
than totalitarian. They have spent most of their time 
on the back foot, reacting to events rather than shap-
ing the agenda. In the maelstrom of day-to-day fire-
fighting, much of it in response to problems they have 
created for themselves, ministers’ efforts to get back 
in control have been ineffective. Initiatives such as 
introducing weekly “meet the press” sessions to ex-
plain government policy, developing an ethical code 
of conduct for Maoist CA members and the prime 
minister vowing to avoid wasting time on unneces-
sary ceremonial duties have yet to have much impact. 
In November 2008, the CPN(M) and its largest coali-
tion partner, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified 
Marxist-Leninist), UML, established a coordination 
committee and in December they agreed to set up four 
high-level commissions.21 But the partnership remains 
shaky. As long as they are at odds, it is no surprise 
that they fail to inspire confidence. The prime minis-
ter’s most deft manoeuvring has been tactical rather 
than strategic. For example, Prachanda surprised the 
Nepali Congress (NC) on 11 November by signing a 
nine-point agreement conceding their demands, 
thereby averting its threat to block the passage of the 
budget, but made no plans to implement his commit-
ments. Meanwhile, his and other Maoist leaders’ re-
 
 
21 These are the state restructuring commission, scientific 
land reform commission (to be headed by Maoist central 
committee member Haribol Gajurel), commission on the in-
vestigation of disappeared persons and truth and reconcilia-
tion commission. 
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peated warnings of a “new revolution” only increase 
suspicions over the UCPN(M)’s intent.22 
The Maoists are still outsiders in Kathmandu’s opinion-
forming circles. Even though they have twice as many 
seats as their nearest rival in the CA, they have almost 
no voice in the mainstream media. Apart from UCPN(M) 
party members, next to no columnist, commentator, 
civil society figure, human rights activist, lawyer, 
journalist or academic writes in support of them. The 
NC, by contrast, enjoys a daily barrage of public 
praise from the very people – former Panchayat lumi-
naries, royal advisers and army emissaries – who or-
chestrated and applauded the two royal coups that 
toppled Congress governments and jailed their leaders. 
To a large extent, the Maoists’ predicament is of their 
own making. Resolutely unclubbable, they have 
mostly kept their distance from the cocktail and semi-
nar circuit that generates the capital’s received wis-
dom. Instead, they have consciously and repeatedly 
antagonised the press, business community and other 
established forces whom they had initially courted 
with talk of cooperation. The incontrovertible evi-
dence of their failure to fulfil commitments is brushed 
off with implausible excuses. They have brought 
problems on themselves by starting to resemble the 
old parties. Their government has already been tar-
nished by nepotism,23 patronage, indecision, junket-
eering and factional fighting. 
 
 
22 See, for example, “PM reiterates revolt warning”, nepal-
news.com, 15 January 2009. 
23 UCPN(M) alleged nepotism includes the following posi-
tions held by members of Prachanda’s family: Samir Dahal 
(under-secretary of PM’s office), son of Prachanda’s younger 
brother Narayan Dahal; Ganga Dahal (officer of PM’s of-
fice), Prachanda’s younger daughter (Indian citizen); Gan-
garam Dahal (un-appointed foreign relations officer), 
Prachanda’s own brother; Renu Pathak (CA member), 
Prachanda’s daughter; Arjun Pathak (officer of CA), Prachanda’s 
son-in-law; Prakash Dahal (prime minister’s PA/accountant), 
Prachanda’s son, salary equal to the under-secretary; Nara-
yan Dahal (CA member), Prachanda’s nephew. Baburam 
Bhattarai’s relatives: Hisila Yami (tourism minister), Babu-
ram’s wife; Taranaj Pandey (PM’s adviser), Baburam’s 
nephew; Praya Yami (National Planning Commission), His-
ila’s older sister; Timila Yami (chairperson of Drinking Wa-
ter Project), Hisila’s older sister; Chirik Shova (member of 
Kathmandu Drinking Water), Hisila’s older sister; Babu-
ram’s younger brother (tariff-fixing committee), head of 
Kathmandu Drinking Water. Arjun Gyawali, “Karyakartako 
kathgharama prachanda-baburam”, Drishti, 18 November 
2008. Minister Hisila Yami also recommended her relative 
Kayo Devi Yami as a member of the Public Service Com-
mission. “CC recommends PSC members”, nepalnews.com, 
23 January 2009. 
Where they have reached out to former rivals, it has 
often been to bring on board surprisingly dubious ad-
visers, including former royalists who neither burnish 
their radical credentials nor temper them with palpa-
ble democratic commitment. Non-Maoists keen to see 
the government succeed at development were heart-
ened by the appointment of Pitamber Sharma, a widely 
respected academic expert, to head the National Plan-
ning Commission.24 But the government so under-
mined and alienated him that he felt forced to resign. 
Many within the governing coalition and beyond imply 
that the Maoists are still an illegitimate force – either 
because of their incomplete democratic transformation, 
because they “stole” the election or because, in the 
words of Congress leader G.P. Koirala, theirs is only 
a “caretaker government” with no brief to shape 
longer-term policies. Of course, the NC was less 
quick to question the unelected post-April 2006 in-
terim government, which it led. In contrast to that 
transitional administration, this government is both 
mandated by a popular vote and constitutionally em-
powered and required to act as a normal government 
at the same time as providing leadership to the consti-
tutional process, just as the CA is entrusted with the 
dual functions of drafting body and legislature. Criti-
cism of the Maoists tends to fail to distinguish be-
tween their role leading a coalition government and 
the bigger questions of their party’s position in the 
peace process. But in both cases, answering such 
criticism is up to the Maoists themselves. They are no 
longer the opposition. 
C. OLD NEPAL: ALIVE AND WELL 
Despite the transition to a federal democratic republic 
and continuing rhetorical commitments to a progres-
sive, socially inclusive “new Nepal”, rumours of the 
old Nepal’s death have been greatly exaggerated. The 
end of the monarchy has in many respects benefited 
the interests it used to serve: the scapegoating of for-
mer king Gyanendra, much as he was responsible for 
his own woes, has freed the Kathmandu elite to re-
group and rebrand themselves. With the UCPN(M) 
now cast as the authoritarian ruler, and providing ex-
amples of continued illiberal behaviour, it is easier to 
categorise anti-Maoist resistance as democratic. 
The noisiest conservative revival has been spear-
headed by the urban upper classes. That the Maoists 
are not the new Khmer Rouge they predicted has not 
 
 
24 The de facto head of the National Planning Commission is 
the vice-chairperson; the prime minister is the ex officio 
chairperson. 
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deterred constant cries of “totalitarian dictatorship”. 
For all their cadres’ sporadic brutality, the Maoists 
have not muzzled the press, locked up political pris-
oners or indeed implemented any notably dictatorial 
measures. Ironically, it is only when they propose 
genuinely illiberal measures such as completely ban-
ning strikes that the “liberal democrats” have rushed 
to embrace them. In contrast, a budget so un-Maoist 
that it satisfied the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was greeted with derision for 
its excessive ambition as well as claims that programs 
such as a national literacy scheme were camouflaged 
steps towards a takeover of the state.25 
Underlying the ritual denunciations is a more serious 
fissure: many people do not want a “new Nepal”. The 
goal of radical transformation, which inevitably im-
plies some uncomfortable upheavals, is not univer-
sally shared. Such fears are not confined to those at 
the top of the pile. Social inclusion is not a zero-sum 
game but in the short term affirmative action of any 
sort does create losers and a sense of reverse dis-
crimination. Many of those who feel threatened be-
long to upper caste groups but are not “elite” in other 
terms. As India’s experience since its introduction of 
quotas and job reservations for marginalised groups 
illustrates, organised resistance from those who had 
come to depend upon privileges is only to be ex-
pected. Given Nepal’s endemic poverty and the se-
vere shortage of career opportunities for young people 
of any background, managing a likely bitter struggle 
will be a great challenge. 
The enduring appeal for some of a unitary state is 
visible in the influential coalition that has emerged to 
guard against the “threat” of ethnic federalism. The 
problem for those alarmed by the prospect of signifi-
cant restructuring is that few have realistic alternative 
plans, least of all the parties that agreed to federalism 
without considering its implications. By January 
2009, three years after formally agreeing to a con-
stituent assembly and with a full nine-month gestation 
period after the CA election, the NC’s internal com-
mittees were still yet to prepare policy options on 
 
 
25 The budget was coloured by some partisan concerns. For 
example, it included a five-project “Program to Honour Po-
litical Sacrifice” bringing development to the mid-western 
Maoist heartland; the Maoists’ informal “capital”, the north-
ern Rolpa village of Thawang will benefit from both con-
struction of the “Shahid Marg” (“Martyrs’ Road”, running 
from Tila to Rukumkot via Ghartigaon and Thawang) and a 
model integrated settlement development program. Budget 
(2008-2009), Annex, “Building New Nepal Campaign”, 
Item J. A generous Rs. 50 million ($650,000) has been allo-
cated to building an enigmatic-sounding “Statue of Repub-
lic” at the former royal palace. Ibid, Item K. 
state restructuring.26 A presentation by one NC leader 
on the topic was cobbled together with quotes from 
Wikipedia;27 a more thoughtful proposal based on se-
rious research and wider consultation is, however, also 
under discussion.28 In short, a lack of consensus among 
political leaders over fundamental issues reflects 
wider public divisions, while fears of change that are 
yet to be channelled into practicable policies only ag-
gravate the tendency for unconstructive opposition. 
If the Maoists are not offering the fresh leadership they 
promised, nor is anyone else. The mass popular fer-
ment of the people’s movement left the existing par-
ties unruffled; the movement to overthrow the 
monarchy did not throw up a single new leader. Ironi-
cally, it was the Madhesi uprising against the post-
monarchical dispensation that brought some new faces 
onto the national political scene. The CA election 
provided an opportunity for voters to have their say 
on the old guard and they did so with gusto. But party-
controlled proportional representation lists allowed 
some, such as G.P. Koirala, to sidestep the risk of al-
lowing voters to deliver a direct verdict. The eighteen 
of his relatives who lost first-past-the-post contests 
initially seemed less fortunate until it transpired that 
electoral defeat had little meaning. UML leader Bam 
Dev Gautam was nominated as home minister by his 
party while former general secretary Madhav Nepal 
was parachuted into the CA as a nominee. Conserva-
tive NC heavyweights such as Govinda Raj Joshi and 
Khum Bahadur Khadka have become more, not less, 
vocal and influential since their defeats.  
D. THE RISKS OF FAILURE 
The peace process does not yet face an imminent risk 
of collapse. Although the original ideal of a broad 
unity government working to shared goals is now 
unlikely, the evidence suggests a prolonged process 
marred by disputes and messy compromises is more 
likely than a deliberate return to violent conflict. The 
international context is positive: no influential inter-
 
 
26 Bishnu Budhathoki, “Koirala still reigns supreme”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 5 January 2008. 
27 Govinda Raj Joshi, Nepalma sanghiya shasan pranali 
(Kathmandu, 2008). See also Aditya Adhikari, “Stalled de-
bate”, The Kathmandu Post, 23 December 2008. Joshi has 
made a serious effort to contribute to public debate, putting 
his proposals forward in the media. See, for example, “6 vata 
vyavaharik pradesh”, Himal Khabarpatrika, 12 February 
2009; “Bahulvadi samsadiya vyavasthaka pakshama”, Naya 
Patrika, 12 February 2009. 
28 Narahari Acharya, Nepali kangreka nimti prastavit gana-
rajya nepalko samrachana ra samvidhansabhako adhar-
patra (Kathmandu, 2009). 
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national players want to see the government fall, en-
courage a military takeover or provoke a return to 
conflict in other forms. Outside Nepal the desire for a 
period of stability, rebuilding and consolidating func-
tional democratic rule is genuine. For its neighbours, 
particularly India, this desire is rooted in solid self-
interest, such as seeing Nepal develop as a partner in 
regional security, a market and an exporter of hydro-
power. New Delhi and other capitals are well aware 
that such aims can only be achieved with political 
stability and a functioning government. 
Nevertheless, the destabilising scenario of inter-party 
dissent and the unresolved future of two powerful for-
mer warring armies means a return to war by mistake 
is always possible. Should that happen, or the peace 
agreement fall apart irretrievably, the chances for a 
new deal will never be as good as they were in 2005. 
Then, a unique combination of circumstances forced 
the Maoists to accept pluralism and the old parties to 
accept the need for reform. The king was discredited, 
international players were willing to support a fresh 
approach, the UN was in a good position to assist and, 
most crucially, people at large were inspired by the 
prospect of a new consensus for peace and change. 
None of these factors is likely to recur as strongly and 
a renewed confluence of such forces is impossible. 
No one may want war but it is a real possibility 
should the Maoists be forced out of government, or 
choose to quit. The Maoists are not planning to go 
back to war, as Prachanda has clarified, despite his 
misleadingly bellicose statements about resuming a 
popular struggle should the UCPN(M) leave the gov-
ernment. But the temptation for other parties to be-
come more militaristic if the Maoists are agitating 
from the streets will be hard to resist. The dividing 
line between “street pressure” and conflict is danger-
ously thin. 
Resumed conflict, as in 2001 and 2003, tends to be more 
brutal and intense than before. Another return to war 
would most likely reinforce that pattern. The Maoists’ 
people’s war strategy remains in place and their 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is, thanks to the 
extended cantonment impasse, larger and better 
trained and organised than ever. But a new round of 
confrontation would be different: in place of rural base-
building, the Maoists are now positioned for an urban 
guerrilla struggle. There are no signs that the NA 
would show any more concern for respecting the laws 
of armed combat, nor that the old parties have devel-
oped any interest in democratic control or enforcing 
international humanitarian law. Needless to say, 
renewed conflict would close the window of 
opportunity to address the pressing social and 
economic problems that underlay the insurgency in 
the first place.  
III. PEACE PARTNERS AT ODDS 
All of the political parties are in disarray, fighting 
with each other and internally. Few articulate a con-
sistent position on major issues or present a united 
face to the public. The UCPN(M) has done better than 
others at managing a heated internal debate but major 
disagreements over strategy remain; at the same time 
its transition to non-violence appears stalled. The in-
creasing volume of NC leaders’ public pronounce-
ments is in inverse proportion to their organisational 
solidity. UML leaders busy themselves launching 
regular assaults on the government of which they are 
a part, while preparing themselves for the leadership 
battle that is set to play out at their February 2009 
general convention. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum 
(MJF) has averted a crippling split but appears unsure 
of how to balance representing Madhesi interests with 
contributing to governance and the peace process. 
The major non-Maoist parties suffer from the same 
weaknesses: lack of internal democracy, no progress 
on making themselves more inclusive, incoherent and 
shifting policy positions, lack of effort to rebuild links 
with voters, and indiscipline, in particular among the 
top-heavy leadership. There is no sign they are heed-
ing their November 2005 commitment “not to repeat 
the mistakes of the past which were committed while 
in parliament and in government”.29 If the constitu-
tion-writing process is completed on schedule, only 
the Maoists appear ready to go back to the electorate 
with a reasonably clear agenda and a functional cam-
paign machine. But even the UCPN(M) is not demon-
strating any visible enthusiasm for a prompt poll. 
A. THE MAOISTS: BRINGING ON THE 
REVOLUTION? 
Strong criticism of the government’s performance has 
come from within the Maoist movement itself, where 
there has been intense debate over tactics and strat-
egy. For outsiders, the state and direction of Maoist 
strategy is of great importance: Are they truly com-
mitted to democracy and non-violence? Will more 
radical elements settle for nothing less than a one-
party state and force a return to conflict? For Maoist 
footsoldiers, the big question is simpler: Is this it? Is 
this what we spent ten years fighting for?  
 
 
29 Twelve-point Agreement, 22 November 2005, Art. 7. 
Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 8 
 
 
Prachanda has swung between urging consensus30 and 
threatening a capture of power.31 His party is em-
broiled in complex debates, where ideological and 
strategic considerations do battle with more pressing 
practical imperatives. The Maoist central committee 
remains divided on many issues but the fissures can-
not be reduced to a simplistic “hardline vs. softline” 
battle.32 Indeed, there is no disagreement on the cen-
tral analysis – that the revolution is yet to be com-
pleted – and the central long-term goal – a people’s 
republic. The chief ideological architect of the Maoist 
approach to the peace process, Baburam Bhattarai, 
has argued that it is precisely in order to bring the 
revolution closer that the UCPN(M) must stick with 
the constitutional process and use all forums – street, 
assembly and government – to hasten the next stage. 
In this context, he has even underlined the need for 
the Maoists to create the turmoil out of which revolu-
tion will emerge, although he used the same address 
to party cadres to reiterate the party’s longstanding 
line that political competition, rather than a Soviet or 
Chinese-style one-party system, will be an essential 
feature of a Maoist republic.33 
A November 2008 national gathering brought to-
gether some 1,100 leaders from different levels and 
regions; it endorsed the new compromise party line of 
a “people’s democratic national republic” and the 
formation of an internal advisory committee on inte-
gration, including PLA commanders. In January 
2009, the CPN(M) merged with the much smaller 
Unity Centre (Masal) to create the Unified Commu-
nist Party of Nepal (Maoist). 
Transforming from an armed movement into a peace-
ful political force was never likely to be an easy proc-
ess. Even the Maoists’ harshest opponents accepted 
that it would take them time to get over the “hang-
over” of their violent past. But as the third anniver-
sary of the ceasefire approaches with the Maoists now 
leading the government, excuses for thuggery and 
brutal lawlessness ring hollow.  
The continued violent conduct of some Maoist cadres, 
which has extended to abduction, torture and murder, 
cannot be dismissed as minor indiscipline. The media 
response to an attack by Maoist cadres on the Hi-
 
 
30 “PM urges politics of consensus”, nepalnews.com, 13 
January 2009. 
31 “PM warns against bid to topple govt”, The Himalayan 
Times, 13 January 2009; “PM Dahal for capturing power if 
govt toppled”, ekantipur.com, 13 January 2009. 
32 Dharmendra Bastola, “Kendriya samitiko baithakka 
nirnayko mahattva”, Janadesh, 23 December 2008. 
33 “Yantrik dhangale sampanna hundaina kranti”, Naya Pa-
trika, 30 January 2009. 
malmedia publishing house was disproportionate.34 
But this incident, one of a number of assaults on jour-
nalists and media corporations, has seriously damaged 
the Maoists’ international reputation and will leave a 
cloud over their relations with outside players for 
some time to come, even if they take action against 
the offenders. For example, it has set back any 
chances of removing the CPN(M) from the U.S. ter-
rorist exclusion list.  
The YCL has been a powerful tool but also a major 
headache. There has been more talk of reorienting it 
to development activities and time-bound promises to 
relinquish the buildings it had occupied and turned 
into de facto garrisons.35 The Maoist commitment in 
the June 2008 agreement was unambiguous: 
The paramilitary functioning and activities of the 
CPN (Maoists)’s Young Communist League (YCL) 
will be completely terminated, and all public, gov-
ernment and private buildings and lands under its 
control will be vacated and returned to the respec-
tive owners within fifteen days. The CPN (Maoist) 
has pledged to all of the political parties that YCL 
activities will fully comply with the laws of the 
land, from this time forward.36 
Although much has been made of its more egregious 
behaviour, its overall level of activity appears to have 
been significantly scaled back from the pre-election 
period. Nevertheless, its militarised structure and 
sheer size, with many members expecting to be taken 
care of and looking jealously towards their relatively 
comfortable and regularly remunerated colleagues in 
the PLA, make institutional change difficult. Party 
leaders want to keep it intact and motivated as an ex-
tra force in uncertain times and as foot soldiers for the 
next election campaign. 
Amid these difficulties, Prachanda is still in charge 
and has cards in his hand. He has ridden out the inter-
nal criticism so far and can use the power and patron-
age of the prime ministership to his advantage. But 
the barrage of dissent has a cumulative impact, weak-
 
 
34 More serious incidents, such as the 18 November discov-
ery of the bodies of two people allegedly killed by the YCL 
in Dhading district and the earlier killings of working jour-
nalists outside the capital, generated less press coverage. 
There were, however, public protests. See, for example, 
“Protest against YCL over killing of two abductees”, ekanti-
pur.com, 19 November 2008. 
35 Ganeshman Pun, “YCL ka agragami karyabhar”, Janadesh, 
23 December 2008. 
36 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the 
Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June 
2008, Art. 3. 
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ening his authority and limiting room for manoeuvre. 
He is constrained by a greater range of pressures than 
ever, needing to balance his own party’s interests with 
those of coalition partners while taking into account 
positions of the NC and the army and continuing to 
reassure international powers that the Maoists’ de-
mocratic transformation will move forward.  
B. UNCERTAIN COALITION PARTNERS 
The UCPN(M)’s two major coalition partners, the 
UML and the MJF, have faced internal debates and 
uncertainty over their role in government. There are 
signs, however, that policy and organisational diffi-
culties are manageable. 
In the run-up to its February 2009 general convention, 
the UML has to cope with a leadership struggle and 
broader questions about its policy platform. Senior 
cadres regularly speak out against the government of 
which it is a coalition member. The most constant 
barrage has been by K.P. Oli, who has announced his 
intention to challenge general secretary Jhalanath 
Khanal for his post. Later in 2008 he was joined by 
former general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, who 
had maintained a dignified silence following his elec-
tion defeat and resignation before launching a campaign 
to return to high office.37 Madhav Nepal’s January 
2009 parachuting into the CA to head the constitutional 
committee will likely reduce his public outbursts. 
K.P. Oli’s offensive, however, will probably be sus-
tained as he seeks publicity and momentum for his 
bid to win the party’s leadership and push for a UML-
led government. Bam Dev Gautam, as home minister 
and deputy prime minister the party’s most senior rep-
resentative in the administration, has complained that 
UML leaders and activists have been undermining the 
government.38 He has, in turn, been subjected to sear-
ing public criticism from the UML press.39 
The UML is still unsure where it stands ideologically, 
tactically and strategically. The extensive political re-
 
 
37 In December 2008 Nepal said his party should not have 
joined the government and accused its leadership of seeking 
power at the expense of cultivating its relationship with the 
wider public: “Nobody will follow the party if we fail to ad-
dress the concerns of the masses”. “Joining govt a folly: Ne-
pal”, ekantipur.com, 16 December 2008.  
38 “UML not helping govt: Home Minister”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 20 December 2008. 
39 One cover story pointedly observed that “In return for the 
party making him deputy prime minister even though he lost 
the election, Gautam has started publicly badmouthing party 
workers”. “Yi bamdev kaska hun kamred?”, Budhabar, 24 
December 2008. 
port presented by its central committee at the general 
convention does, however, offer a serious analysis of 
its past weaknesses and a detailed blueprint for its fu-
ture positioning.40 It cannot reconcile itself to being a 
junior partner to the UCPN(M) on the left, but its ef-
forts to stand up have been patchy and often, as in the 
case of its YCL-modelled Youth Force, counterpro-
ductive. It is unlikely to be tempted into an NC-led 
“broader democratic alliance” (see below) unless 
there is an immediate incentive, such as the offer of 
the prime ministership. In the face of the Maoists’ 
scepticism towards parliamentary democracy, the 
relevance of the UML’s alternative, “people’s multi-
party democracy”, is unclear.41 It identified the mon-
archy as the main threat to democracy and, forged in a 
period when the UML had signed up to parliamentary 
democracy, sits uneasily with the party’s call for a 
parallel system of a popularly elected president along-
side a popularly elected prime minister. 
Against this backdrop, the UML has made little of its 
capacity to act as a mediating force. Following the 
pattern established from the earliest negotiations of 
2005, neither the UCPN(M) nor the NC have looked 
to it as a bridge, even when their relations have been 
at their most strained; the UML’s own lack of a co-
herent approach has meant no initiative to establish 
itself as a credible honest broker able to boost its own 
importance by bringing the two sides closer together. 
The 16-21 February 2009 general convention should 
help clear the air: it is slated to create new senior po-
sitions, including a party president and vice president, 
largely to accommodate senior leaders irked at their 
current marginalisation. A decisive mandate for the 
new leadership may quell public dissent. The conven-
tion may not take dramatic steps to reposition the 
party but will acknowledge organisational shortcom-
ings and initiate moves to reinvigorate the party. Pro-
posed changes to the party constitution are likely to 
invite serious debate;42 there are, however, almost cer-
 
 
40 “Political Report”, CPN(UML) Central Committee, Janu-
ary 2009. 
41 A week-long January 2009 central committee meeting re-
affirmed this policy, introduced by revered former leader 
Madan Bhandari in the wake of the 1990 transition to multi-
party democracy, as the party’s basic line. “UML adopts PMPD 
as guiding principle”, The Himalayan Times, 15 January 2009. 
42 The UML’s proposed new party structure has a chairper-
son above the general secretary. “Vidhan Samshodhan 
Prastav”, UML Central Committee, Kathmandu, January 
2009. The key elements are set out in “Emaleko samshodhit 
vidhan tayar”, Budhabar, 28 January 2009. Some influential 
central committee members, including Pradip Gyawali and 
Shankar Pokharel, have registered an alternative proposal for 
revisions to the party statute, as have a group of youth lead-
Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 10 
 
 
tain to be some moves towards more inclusive struc-
tures and efforts to address the widely acknowledged 
gap between leadership and grassroots workers. If 
nothing else, the convention should mark a serious 
effort to face up to the party’s difficulties and embark 
on an overdue internal debate. 
The MJF had to cope with policy confusion over its 
“one Madhes” line as an internal rebellion was gather-
ing steam.43 It is ill prepared to cope with any new 
Madhes uprising, having neither abandoned its claim 
to leadership of the “one Madhes” campaign nor done 
much to deliver on it. Its stance towards armed groups 
has long been unclear and is more problematic now 
that it is in government. Its relatively upper-caste and 
better-off supporters and members will be threatened 
by further identity politics movements. At the same 
time, it could be outflanked by a more organised chal-
lenge from the Tarai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP), 
Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) or other Madhesi par-
ties if it cannot consolidate its base. Dissatisfaction 
with party leader and foreign minister Upendra Yadav 
developed into an open challenge, with senior figures 
calling for their ministers to resign from the govern-
ment and force a change in policy and leadership. 
Nevertheless, its January 2009 general convention 
appears to have brought some stability. Although 
marked by disputes and unrest, it ultimately saw party 
president Upendra Yadav unanimously re-elected. On 
7 February, a meeting of its new central committee 
agreed to its strategy and endorsed its role in the coa-
lition, while directing its ministers to report regularly 
to the party on their progress. Party leaders have be-
come less ambivalent towards their position in the 
coalition, insisting the Maoist-led government is the 
only viable option and working hard to communicate 
successes. For example, the MJF’s joint chairman, J. 
P. Gupta, presented the government’s February 2009 
ordinances as a joint achievement for which his party 
deserved credit, arguing that the ordinance on job 
quotas in public services fulfilled several of the 
MJF’s pre-election demands.44 
Other coalition partners are also not fully in the fold. 
When the UCPN(M) expressed the view that Madhesi 
parties are working for foreign powers, the reaction of 
 
 
ers who argue they have stronger proposals for internal de-
mocracy. The stage is set for a genuine debate. 
43 When MJF leader and government minister Bijay Kumar 
Gachhedar suggested the “one Madhes” policy had become 
irrelevant he was subjected to a barrage of criticism from 
within the party. See “Gachhadar’s uttterings stir hornet’s 
nest”, THT Online, 16 December 2008. 
44 “MPRF not to quit govt”, myrepublica.com, 9 February 2009. 
the commerce minister and president of the Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party, Rajendra Mahato, was to accuse 
the Maoists themselves of being foreign agents.45 
Such public trading of insults may be partly theatrical 
but suggests inter-party relations are disturbingly dys-
functional. 
C. THE OPPOSITION: REINVIGORATED, BUT 
FOR WHAT? 
A vigorous opposition has enlivened the political scene 
and played a useful role in challenging government 
policy. Some robust criticism and debate, especially 
when the CA has functioned as legislature, has added 
to the sense of a return to democratic politics. There 
are solid grounds for opposition: for example, the 
prime minister’s failure to fulfil his commitment to 
the assembly to implement the NC-backed nine-point 
demands by 15 December became not just a breach of 
inter-party agreement but a betrayal of a promise 
made to the legislature as a whole.46 But methods are 
not always helpful, as evidenced by the growing ten-
dency to resort to boycotting or obstructing CA pro-
ceedings.47 More worryingly, the major opposition 
parties are in a bad shape internally and often prefer 
the spoiler’s role to constructive criticism. 
1. The Nepali Congress 
The NC has not made up its mind as to whether it is 
in or out of the peace process. Adopting the easy route 
of spoiling for its own sake, party leaders have not 
decided whether to use their considerable leverage to 
win specific concessions in return for cooperation or 
whether to devote all their effort to wrecking the gov-
ernment and hoping to supplant it upon its collapse. 
In the meantime, the party is less democratic than 
ever. It has made no moves towards more representa-
tive or accountable leadership, rather the reverse. 
Party president G.P. Koirala declared himself parlia-
mentary party leader without any debate, let alone a 
vote. He then adjourned discussions on the appoint-
 
 
45 “Maoists biggest foreign agents: Minister Mahato”, ekan-
tipur.com, 18 December 2008. 
46 See “NC set to disrupt next session of Parliament”, The 
Himalayan Times, 16 December 2008. 
47 During the CA’s budget session, the Tarai Madhes De-
mocratic Party (TMDP) blocked proceedings for twelve days 
(demanding implementation of the February 2008 Madhesi-
government agreement), the NC for five days (demanding 
implementation of their nine-point agreement with the gov-
ernment) and the smaller parties for four days (over scholar-
ship quotas). 
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ment of a deputy leader in order to avoid the possibil-
ity of an election for that position. The mute accep-
tance of his high-handedness (with only Narahari 
Acharya voicing dissent within the Central Working 
Committee) is indicative of the weakness of the NC’s 
second-rank leaders, whom Koirala has reduced, in 
the words of one journalist, to “subservient sub-
jects”.48 Even usually supportive media outlets have 
become restive in the face of the party’s wilful resis-
tance to serve its own interests by reform.49 
Koirala’s insistence on remaining parliamentary 
leader does not extend to an immediate interest in par-
liamentary functioning. The NC has repeatedly boy-
cotted the CA; following the opening sitting, Koirala 
himself has not attended a single CA session and his 
main internal rival, Sher Bahadur Deuba, has only 
shown up twice.50 The delay in finalising the parlia-
mentary party’s statute, which was eventually agreed 
on 4 February 2009, affected the Constitutional 
Council, which makes appointments to important 
bodies such as the Public Service Commission and 
Election Commission, as it required the participation 
of the leader of the opposition.51 
Party organisation is also in disarray. Despite his 
autocratic hold on the party, Koirala has only visited 
the NC headquarters eight times in the last four 
years.52 In October 2008 he promised to reinvigorate 
the party within three months and launched an 
“awareness campaign” to rebuild its electoral base 
and, more importantly, to continue the still incom-
plete reunification of the party following its 2002 
split.53 Results have been mixed at best. The party 
remains riven, with the unseemly public tussles be-
tween its two main wings even extending overseas.54 
Since its refusal to join the government means that 
 
 
48 Bishnu Budhathoki, “Koirala still reigns supreme”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 5 January 2009. 
49 See, for example, “Congress course correction”, editorial, 
Nepali Times, 12 December 2008. 
50 “Samvidhansabha jandainan thula neta”, Naya Patrika, 7 
January 2009. Prachanda also has a bad record for CA atten-
dance, with only four appearances, although he might claim 
the excuse of government business. 
51 “Koirala still reigns supreme”, op. cit. 
52 Kiran Pokharel, “Sunsan kangres mukhyalay”, Annapurna 
Post, 24 December 2008. 
53 “NC will be reorganised within three months, claims 
Koirala”, ekantipur.com, 6 October 2008; and “Koirala in 
Biratnagar to begin NC ‘revival campaign’”, nepal-
news.com, 23 October 2008. 
54 In New York, rival pro-Koirala and pro-Deuba interna-
tional contact offices still struggle for supremacy. Crisis 
Group interview, Nepali Congress supporter, New York, 8 
December 2008. 
senior figures cannot be pacified with ministerial of-
fice, the succession battle has become more intense 
and more complex, with smaller factions coalescing 
around leaders including Sushil Koirala, Ramchandra 
Poudel and K.B. Gurung.55 
The NC has, however, taken to its opposition role 
with vigour, harrying the government with all weap-
ons available to it. Its choice of targets has sometimes 
been ill-advised or disingenuous and its language 
never dispassionate, but it has kept the government on 
its toes. Koirala, still energised by his sense of be-
trayal at having been denied the presidency, confi-
dently predicts the imminent collapse of the government. 
“The prime minister must have the guts to step down”, 
threatens one CA member. “We are ready to run the 
government”.56 Others, such as Ramchandra Poudel, 
are only slightly more circumspect, saying that the 
Maoists working “under the guardianship of Koirala” 
is the only way forward: “We don’t have any inten-
tion to pull down this government. This government 
will collapse because of their own contradictions”.57 
The Maoists should take these warning shots seri-
ously. Verdicts on the NC’s own stints in power have 
been mixed but none can deny that Koirala is an ex-
perienced wrecker of governments. Since throwing 
away his own absolute majority in 1994, he has had a 
hand in the fall of most administrations, including 
those of his own party under rival leaders Sher Ba-
hadur Deuba and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. But unless 
the NC can show that its criticism is constructive it 
risks tarnishing its name further. Nepali voters deliv-
ered a damning electoral verdict. Internationally, the 
NC’s reputation has sunk to new depths. Formerly 
sympathetic observers despair at its undemocratic be-
haviour and shambolic apparatus.58 If it does not pull 
itself together, an unreformed NC will continue doing 
a serious disservice to the sizeable section of the 
population that would like to be represented by a 
competent, committed liberal democratic party. 
 
 
55 See Santosh Acharya, “Gut-upagutko birami”, Nepal, 15 
February 2009. 
56 “NC is ready to form the government”, Navindra Raj 
Joshi, People’s Review, 8 January 2009. Joshi insists, how-
ever, that he was only speaking theoretically rather than call-
ing for an immediate change in administration. Crisis Group 
interview, Kathmandu, 12 January 2009. 
57 Interview, Spotlight, 9 January 2009. 
58 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, Washington DC and 
London, November 2008-January 2009. 
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2. The smaller parties 
Many smaller parties are increasingly frustrated and 
fear that their presence in the CA is destined to be 
decorative. Although the CA committees were struc-
tured to ensure full inclusion of all parties represented 
in the CA, the lack of debate on the assembly floor 
and the continuing pattern of major decisions being 
taken by only a few large party leaders has left them 
feeling sidelined. The symbolic challenge of Dalit 
Janajati Party leader Bishwendra Paswan to Madhav 
Nepal’s installation as chair of the constitutional 
committee reflects this frustration. Of the parties out-
side government, the TMDP is probably the most in-
fluential. Its decision not to join the administration 
and, in January 2009, to launch an agitation calling 
for the implementation of past agreements and the ful-
filment of Madhesi demands may earn it some of the 
credibility and organisational presence that it lacked 
going into the election. 
3. A “broader democratic alliance”? 
The right wing of Nepali politics, marginalised by the 
electorate and thrown out of step by the abolition of 
the monarchy, is seeking to regroup. The strong con-
servative wing of the NC was happy to oppose the 
party line on federalism and republicanism even in the 
run-up to the CA election.59 It failed to split the then 
seven-party alliance or to wean its party away from 
the peace process consensus but has now joined hands 
with former Panchayat luminaries to call for a 
“broader democratic alliance”. A conservative column 
outlines the plan: 
The [NC leaders] have been making the necessary 
noises, but till now have failed to form strong and 
appropriate alliances. First and foremost, the UML 
and the most important Tarai parties have to be 
dislodged from the deadly embrace of the Mao-
ists…. Then the NC must assiduously work toward 
integrating the smaller democratic parties like the 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party and the Nepal 
Janashakti Party [sic] in the new coalition. The 
CPN-Maoists can join as a junior partner, or not at 
all. Then only can the agenda of a new Nepal 
really begin.60 
The idea has been publicly promoted primarily by the 
smaller right-wing parties, although it has been ech-
oed sympathetically by influential NC insiders. “If it 
 
 
59 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Land-
scape, op. cit., p. 8. 
60 Shashi P.B.B. Malla and Chandra Bahadur Parbate, “End 
of the road for Maoists”, People’s Review, 18 December 2008. 
becomes necessary, if the Maoists continue to act the 
way they are doing and invite instability, we must go 
ahead by forming a democratic alliance that includes 
many political parties”, warned G.P. Koirala’s daugh-
ter, Sujata Koirala. But she tempered her comments 
by adding: “We will form this alliance not to bring 
down the Maoist government or to bring instability, 
but to bring stability to the country and prevent it 
from becoming a failed state … if the Maoists are 
concerned about the country and want to join the alli-
ance, they are welcome”.61 Former Prime Minister 
Surya Bahadur Thapa has been a vocal proponent, as 
have other former Panchayat luminaries.62 Some, 
however, are more cautious. For example, influential 
former royal minister Kamal Thapa, who heads a roy-
alist splinter party, has doggedly stuck to his monar-
chist principles but has also insisted that the Maoist-
led government should not be brought down.63  
The former king has mostly kept his counsel. The one 
issue that prompted him to speak out was a contro-
versy over the Maoists’ attempt to replace Indian 
priests with Nepalis at the country’s major Hindu 
temple, Pashupatinath. The sight of the coalition that 
sprung up to oppose the move – royalists, conserva-
tives in the major parties and press, India’s Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) and Hindutva extremists such as 
the Bajrang Dal – may have made some nostalgic for 
the last days of the embattled monarchy. But it also 
stood as a reminder of Gyanendra’s baggage. Even if 
the BJP return to power in New Delhi, a royalist re-
vival built on support from the neighbour’s Hindu 
right will not win mass support. 
 
 
61 “The Maoists are trapped in a conspiracy”, interview with 
Sujata Koirala, The Kathmandu Post, 19 January 2009. 
62 See, for example, “Thapa reinforces Koirala’s idea of 
BDA”, nepalnews.com, 6 December 2008; and “NC, now, 
has to lead democratic forces, says RPP chairman”, ekanti-
pur.com, 5 December 2008. 
63 “No alternative to Maoist-led govt: Kamal Thapa”, ekanti-
pur.com, 3 January 2009. 
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IV. THE TWO ARMIES 
A. THE INTEGRATION IMPASSE 
The challenge for the security sector is reaching 
agreement on the integration of Maoist combatants. 
There is a serious difference of opinion over what 
form this should take. The impasse over this issue, 
central to the peace process, is particularly debilitat-
ing: it hinders progress in other areas and indefinitely 
prolongs a UN arms monitoring role that was initially 
envisaged as only a short-term transitional measure. 
In the meantime, those in the PLA cantonments who 
did not meet the UN’s verification standards – new 
and under-age recruits – have still not been dis-
charged. This is a result of Maoist foot-dragging but 
also due to uncertainty over their rehabilitation. The 
Maoist-led government promised swift action to UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaras-
wamy, who visited Nepal at the beginning of Decem-
ber 2008. But getting this first program of discharge 
and rehabilitation right has broader implications, af-
fecting the credibility of the whole integration and re-
habilitation process. 
1. What the agreements say 
The numerous written commitments are ambiguous 
and deliberately vague. The November 2006 CPA 
called for a special committee “to carry out monitor-
ing, adjustment and rehabilitation of the Maoist com-
batants”;64 the December 2007 Agreement on 
Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies 
(AMMAA) referred to “integration into the security 
forces”;65 the interim constitution specified that the 
special committee would “supervise, integrate and re-
habilitate the combatants of the Maoist Army”.66 This, 
in turn, was amended to stipulate “a special commit-
tee … representing all the major political parties in 
the Constituent Assembly” – a change prompted by 
the need to include the NC despite its absence from 
 
 
64 CPA, Art. 4.4. 
65 “Those who are eligible for integration into the security 
forces will be determined by a special committee as agreed 
in the Comprehensive Peace Accord. This integration proc-
ess will be determined in subsequent agreement with the par-
ties”. AMMAA, Art. 4.1.3. 
66 “The Council of Ministers shall form a special committee 
to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the combatants of the 
Maoist Army, and the functions, duties and powers of the 
committee shall be as determined by the Council of Minis-
ters”. Interim Constitution, Art. 146. 
the government.67 This reincarnation of the erstwhile 
“146 Committee”, named after the interim constitu-
tion article that mandated it but never a functional 
body, was christened the Army Integration Special 
Committee (AISC). 
The June 2008 multiparty agreement that led to this 
amendment further specified that verified combatants 
would “be offered a choice between an economic 
package and various other alternatives for rehabilita-
tion”.68 For those “who choose integration”, only 
those duly registered in cantonments “will be deemed 
eligible for possible integration with the security bod-
ies, after fulfilling the standard requirements”.69 
The letter of the various agreements is thus confusing. 
There are two extreme interpretations: that no Maoist 
combatants should be allowed to join the Nepalese 
Army (NA), or that all should be allowed to join – 
and in formed units rather than individually under the 
existing chain of command and regulations. Negotia-
tors from both sides confirm that from 2005 onwards 
the implicit mutual understanding was that a signifi-
cant number, but far from all, of the Maoist combat-
ants would be integrated into the NA.70 Both sides 
accept that there was no agreement on numbers (al-
though the ballpark figures both speak of in private, in 
the low thousands, are not dramatically divergent) or 
on modalities, hence the conscious vagueness of lan-
guage in the formal deals. 
There was, however, little will to implement the 
agreement and build on the chances for compromise 
on numbers and methods. Nor did the signatories to 
the various deals necessarily speak for the bodies they 
purported to control. The NA was not answerable to 
the seven-party interim government and has made it 
clear it retains its own red lines. The PLA was under 
CPN(M) control but appears not to have been fully 
consulted on the terms of deals, in particular on the 
June 2008 agreement’s implication that any integra-
tion will be on the NA’s terms (with individual com-
batants having to meet its requirements) and delinked 
from the parallel question of NA restructuring. 
Following much wrangling, the CPN(M) and UML 
agreed on 18 December 2008 to expand the AISC to 
include two members from each of the four major 
 
 
67 Fifth Amendment to Interim Constitution of Nepal, 13 July 
2008, Art. 20, “Amendment of Article 146 of the Constitution”. 
68 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the 
Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June 
2008, Art. 2.2.2. Unofficial translation at www.un.org.np. 
69 Ibid., Art. 2.2.3. 
70 Crisis Group interviews, NC and CPN(M) negotiators, 
Kathmandu, October 2008. 
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parties, thereby meeting the NC’s demand for parity 
of representation.71 It was decided that the prime min-
ister, rather than his deputy as formerly proposed, 
would head the committee himself. The AISC was fi-
nally constituted and met for the first time on 16 
January 2009, with the initial task of defining its 
terms of reference and procedures. A second meeting 
on 5 February decided to discharge disqualified Mao-
ist combatants as soon as possible and promised to 
provide appropriate rehabilitation packages. These 
steps had already been agreed; substantive discussion 
on the central integration and rehabilitation questions 
will not be as straightforward. 
More immediately, the AISC’s responsibility for 
overseeing the PLA has not been clearly defined. Ad-
dressing the PLA at its anniversary program on 12 
February, Prachanda told combatants that while their 
existing command structure would remain in place, 
the AISC would now be responsible for its direction 
and planning.72 Turning this commitment into reality 
will depend on both the AISC’s capacity to agree 
such directions and the PLA’s willingness to follow 
its instruction. 
2. The Nepalese Army position 
The NA was never in favour of integration and re-
mains extremely reluctant to allow the process to go 
ahead. It sees itself as a professional and apolitical 
force which should not be undermined by incorporat-
ing former guerrillas. More importantly, it feels it was 
undefeated and remains the only legitimate armed 
force in the country.  
The NA’s insistence on any candidates for integration 
meeting “standard requirements” has added an addi-
tional element of confusion. It is seen by PLA com-
manders as a none-too-subtle means of excluding 
large numbers of combatants who do not have the 
educational and physical qualifications specified in 
NA recruitment standards. Furthermore, NA officers 
privately maintain that they can only accept candi-
dates for integration on an individual, entry-level ba-
sis, as ordinary soldiers or officer cadets. PLA 
commanders insist they should be included at various 
ranks, although they accept that this may require in-
 
 
71 When the government had first announced the formation 
of the committee, on 28 October, it had two CPN(M) mem-
bers to only one from each of the other parties. 
72 Prachanda, speech at program to commemorate the four-
teenth anniversary of the “people’s war” and the eighth PLA 
Day, Nawalparasi, 12 February 2009; edited extracts pub-
lished as “Shantiko ladainma samarpit bhaera lagnuhos”, 
Janadesh, 17 February 2009. 
tensive training. They also argue for putting formed 
units under joint command during a transitional pe-
riod rather than assimilating individuals into the exist-
ing NA structure (see below). 
An unhelpful side debate has emerged, with many 
pro-NA commentators citing “international norms” on 
integration as a reason for barring any PLA entry into 
the NA. Some have argued that including former 
guerrillas would make the NA ineligible for future 
UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, there are no ap-
plicable international norms, and the speciousness of 
the claimed impact on UN involvement was exposed 
by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon during his 
visit to Nepal.73 
NA officers are genuinely frustrated that PLA com-
manders get to speak out, giving frequent media in-
terviews and taking part in UCPN(M) policy 
discussion, while “no one speaks for us”. In contrast, 
the NA was neither involved directly in peace nego-
tiations nor represented by parties it fully trusted or 
who were placed to enter meaningful commitments 
on its behalf. It remains suspicious even of the parties 
who have been most vocal in backing its stance on 
recruitment to fill vacancies (see below). For exam-
ple, NA officers still feel the post-1990 democratic 
governments treated it with disdain – from the NC 
squeezing its budgets to the UML forcing out an army 
chief over corruption allegations. However, its 
strongest international ally, India, shares most of its 
concerns over integration and can be relied upon to 
resist any steps that appear to threaten its existing 
structure and culture. 
3. The PLA position 
The PLA remains disciplined and subject to 
UCPN(M) political control but frustration is mount-
ing. More than two years after entering cantonments 
combatants still have no idea of their future. Ques-
tions are now being raised over the wisdom of enter-
ing the peace process in the first place. It is not clear 
what form the Maoists’ proposed internal integration 
recommendation committee will take but the tensions 
on this issue are real and relate not just to process but 
to major differences on substantive outcome. 
 
 
73 In a question and answer session, the Secretary-General 
clarified that “there were many such cases, even in peacekeep-
ing operations, in which even former rebels, when they were 
integrated into the national armies of member states of the 
United Nations, were recruited as part of UN peacekeeping 
operations”. Press conference, Kathmandu, 1 November 2008. 
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PLA commanders’ concerns in some ways mirror 
those of their NA counterparts. Although they are 
more integrated in the Maoist movement’s political 
structure, there is increasing evidence that they were 
never fully consulted on the integration question. 
Prachanda has clearly been well ahead of his party 
with his regular assurances that a deal has been done 
and the process will shortly be under way. He is now 
facing a backlash. The seven Maoist division com-
manders have started indicating publicly that they will 
insist on bulk integration, rather than individual entry, 
and that they will not accept the NA’s existing re-
cruitment standards.74 “We may agree to somewhat 
different modalities after further discussion”, said one 
senior commander, “but there is no question of send-
ing our people outside our command”.75 
The PLA top brass are still committed to the concept 
of integration as they define it. They are united in 
wanting to move beyond being a party army and in 
refusing to join an unreformed NA but differ on the 
timetable and modalities. Influential senior UCPN(M) 
leader Mohan Baidya’s position, supported by PLA 
Deputy Commander Baldev, is that integration should 
be carried out in parallel with constitution-writing and 
should be completed only once the new constitution is 
in place – thus retaining some independent armed in-
fluence and insurance against disbanding the PLA be-
fore the outcome of the constitutional process is set in 
stone. However, much of the PLA, like the party 
leadership, appears to favour getting integration un-
derway sooner. There has also been talk of a possible 
referendum on the question as a means of short-
circuiting the AISC deadlock.76 The belated constitu-
tion of that committee may render such alternatives 
unnecessary, but only if it proves functional. 
In the meantime the PLA is further consolidated as an 
organised force: discipline appears intact and military 
training has been stepped up – with the supposed ra-
tionale of bringing combatants up to standard for en-
try into the new NA. The PLA’s formal organisation 
is certainly greater than during the war, although it 
 
 
74 Naya Patrika, 8 December 2008, p. 1. 
75 “NA is no longer a national army”, Baldev interview, The 
Kathmandu Post, 8 December 2008. “In line with Nepal’s 
new situation, we should create a joint command. In the first 
phase of integration a coordination command of the top 
leadership of the two armies can be created. They can form 
plans together, but the orders given will be passed down through 
separate channels. The units of the NA and PLA will remain 
separate. Then according to the new policy, we will under-
take downsizing. According to this decision, there may be a 
reduction in the numbers of both PLA and NA commanders”. 
76 Basudev Ghimire, “Sena samayojan sahamatima va jana-
mat sangraha?”, Janadisha, 23 December 2008. 
may well be less motivated. This is especially so 
given that its numbers were bulked up with recent re-
cruits, while some commanders, in particular political 
commissars, were transferred to the YCL rather than 
being cantoned. (Payments to cantoned combatants 
are now being made by cheque in the name of indi-
viduals, so there is less chance for the party to divert a 
portion but all the more reason for YCL commanders 
and others to be envious of their PLA colleagues’ 
relative financial comfort.) 
The separation of commanders who want to move 
into politics and those staying with the PLA seems 
more or less complete, although some (especially An-
anta, who is close to Prachanda and still speaks for 
the PLA informally despite having joined the CA) 
bridge the gap. The PLA’s determination to ensure 
impunity for its conflict-era and subsequent offences 
remains as solid as that of the NA. It is still sheltering 
individuals like Bibidh, a division commander sus-
pected of prime responsibility for overseeing the 
murder of Ram Hari Shrestha in Shaktikhor canton-
ment (see below). While more willing to admit to 
“mistakes” in its past actions, it drags its feet on 
transparent investigations and resists action against 
those found responsible for crimes.77 
4. Other parties 
Apart from the UCPN(M), the major parties have not 
been enthusiastic supporters of PLA combatants’ in-
tegration into the NA. The NC has adopted an in-
creasingly strident campaign against any integration; 
in this it has been supported by the MJF and, increas-
ingly if inconsistently, by some of the louder voices 
within the UML leadership, although not the party itself. 
Much of this opposition has been presented as a mat-
ter of immutable non-violent principle. But such ar-
guments are largely spurious. The NC’s position on 
violence has never been clear-cut. B.P. Koirala, the 
first NC prime minister, was proud to have entered 
politics by being “drawn to the [Indian] terrorist 
movement of the 1930s” and arrested on murder 
charges.78 In preparation for the armed movement to 
 
 
77 The NA and CPN(M) responses to UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Bardiya inves-
tigations are instructive. While the NA attempted to cover up 
its offences, the CPN(M) accepted responsibility for twelve 
of the fourteen killings attributed to its forces; in the remain-
ing two cases there is credible doubt. However, neither side 
has supported criminal investigation and prosecution of its 
members. “Conflict-related Disappearances in Bardiya Dis-
trict”, OHCHR-Nepal, December 2008, pp. 46-50, 53-56.  
78 Anirudha Gupta, Nepalese Interviews (Delhi, 1997), p. 9. 
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overthrow the hereditary Rana prime ministership in 
1950 he found it easy to reject the Gandhian approach: 
“My own non-violence was always a matter of tactics 
rather than an article of faith”.79 The UML’s most 
outspoken opponent of integration, K.P. Oli, knows 
well about political violence himself. Finding the 
people’s war line of the UML’s precursor, the CPN(ML), 
insufficiently radical, he became one of the leaders of 
the “Jhapali” movement that sought to bring forward 
the revolution by murdering landlords.80  
Frequently aired insistences that the Maoists should 
follow the NC’s example from the 1950s by disband-
ing their own armed units voluntarily and embracing 
the state army as the sole legitimate force rest on a 
similarly patchy reading of history. When NC ministers 
joined the first post-Rana government, they not only 
refused to fly the national flag of Nepal on their vehi-
cles, preferring their party pennants, but retained their 
own “liberation army” bodyguards even when visiting 
the royal palace for cabinet meetings.81 Current NC 
leaders’ claims that they never sought, or achieved, 
integration of their guerrillas in the national army (in-
stead allowing them to become the backbone of the new 
police force) are not supported by reliable historians.82 
Motivations for opposing possible PLA-NA integra-
tion are, in fact, threefold: the genuine fear that the 
Maoists would use the process to weaken or co-opt 
the state security forces and establish a totalitarian re-
gime; the political opportunity of compensating for 
poor election results by cultivating the NA as a pow-
erful, anti-Maoist ally; and, conversely, the worry 
that, despite their apparent enmity, the Maoists and 
army top brass could cut a deal that would sideline 
unarmed parties. 
 
 
79 Ibid., p. 10. 
80 Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and John Whelpton, Peo-
ple, Politics & Ideology (Kathmandu, 1999), p. 83. 
81 Rajesh Gautam, Nepali Congress (New Delhi, 2005), p. 471. 
82 “The bulk of the Kirati section of the Rakshya Dal, which 
had played a prominent role in the K.I. Singh revolt, was 
disbanded, and the remaining units were incorporated into 
either the state army or the civil police”. Bhuwan Lal Joshi 
and Leo E. Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case 
Study of Political Acculturation (Berkeley, 1966), p. 101. 
Rajesh Gautam observes: “During that time [1950-1951] 
many Nepalese had the view that somebody among the 
commanders of Mukti Sena [the NC “liberation army”] 
should be the Commander-in-Chief of the national army and 
Mukti Sena should be as an independent army, and the gov-
ernment of the multiple party should be formed. But those 
views were ignored after the Delhi treaty due to the compul-
sion and weakness of the leaders”. Gautam, Nepali Con-
gress, op. cit., p. 470. 
The first fear has solid theoretical grounds. As NC 
leaders have cogently and correctly argued, Maoist 
strategy still calls for a complete capture of state 
power by all available means.83 From the prime min-
ister down, Maoist leaders have not only refused to 
revise this line but have repeatedly emphasised it. 
Nevertheless, a few thousand former PLA combatants 
diluted in a much larger national force would repre-
sent a far less potent force than their current inde-
pendent army. If seizing power is their aim, integration 
would be more of an obstacle than an advantage. 
The fear that the two militaries could cut a mutually 
acceptable deal is more pertinent. One commentator 
has observed that “the most significant change in 
Kathmandu has been the growing warmth in ties be-
tween the Maoists and the Nepalese Army (NA). For 
those who thought that their bitter past would not al-
low the two sides to engage with each other, this may 
have come as a shock. But this relationship, and rap-
prochement, is happening at several levels”.84 Infor-
mal talks between the PLA and NA (the latter 
represented by retired officers rather than current 
commanders) have been constructive – and have not 
included the political parties. For all the argument 
over NA recruitment (see below), the Maoist defence 
minister has sought not to ruffle feathers and has pri-
vately lobbied for additional resources for the NA.85 
“Of course we’re scared of the army, just as we are of 
the Maoists”, noted one senior NC leader. “They both 
have guns and we don’t so why shouldn’t we be 
scared?”86 Such worries only add to the case for 
prompt action to move the process forward. The longer 
the deadlock continues, the more it serves the more 
militant camps on both ends of the political spectrum. 
B. NEW NEPAL, NEW ARMY? 
With the pressing immediacy of the integration de-
bate, it is easy to forget that the peace process was 
meant to deliver far more than just the assimilation of 
some former guerrillas into a national army. The es-
sence of the consensus on the security sector was two-
 
 
83 See, for example, Ram Sharan Mahat, “Betrayal of the 
peace process?”, The Kathmandu Post, 14 December 2008; 
and RJP leader Prakash Chandra Lohani, “Revisiting strate-
gic intent”, The Kathmandu Post, 7 February 2009. On the 
unchanging fundamentals of Maoist strategy, see Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit.; also Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, op. cit., p. 5. 
84 Prashant Jha, “Troubled Beginnings”, South Asia Intelli-
gence Review, 8 December 2008. 
85 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Kathmandu, October 
and December 2008. 
86 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2008. 
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fold: the PLA would, through the integration of some 
combatants into state security forces and the rehabili-
tation of others, be in effect dissolved; the NA would 
be brought under democratic control and significantly 
reformed. The CPA contained detailed commitments: 
The Interim Council of Ministers shall prepare and 
implement the detailed action plan for the democ-
ratisation of the Nepali Army on the basis of po-
litical consensus and the suggestions of the 
committee concerned of the Interim Legislature. 
This includes, among other things, right-sizing, 
democratic restructuring reflecting the national 
and inclusive character and imparting training to 
the Nepali Army on the values of democracy and 
human rights.87 
The interim constitution specified that “the Council of 
Ministers shall, with the consent of the political par-
ties and by seeking the advice of the concerned com-
mittee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an 
extensive work plan for the democratization of the 
Nepalese Army and implement it”.88 The need for in-
clusiveness was reaffirmed in the fifth constitutional 
amendment, which added further legal stipulations for 
action.89 Despite continuing debate within the party 
over the modalities of integration, Maoist political 
leaders and PLA commanders have always had a clear 
view on the parallel nature of the process. In the 
words of one senior commander: 
As a party, we feel that integration is not simply a 
matter of the PLA being merged into the NA. PLA 
combatants will not join the NA just to get a job, 
under standards and norms created in the past. We 
have made this clear. What we’re saying is that 
both the PLA and the NA need to be raised to a 
new standard. This means that the army can’t sim-
ply keep its old structure under which they were 
used and deployed by the feudalists and the mon-
archy. And the PLA also can’t remain as the army 
of a single party. Both these armies need to be 
transformed, a new national army and a new na-
tional security policy created.90 
 
 
87 CPA, Art. 4.7. 
88 Interim Constitution, Art. 144(3). 
89 The fifth amendment introduced an additional sub-article 
(4A) to Art. 144: “In order to make the Nepalese Army na-
tional in character, the entry of citizens, including Madhesis, 
indigenous nationalities, Dalits, women and those from mar-
ginalized areas, shall be ensured through legal provisions on 
the principles of equality and inclusiveness”. 
90 Interview with Baldev, The Kathmandu Post, 8 December 
2008. 
The NA itself has indicated its awareness of the need 
for some change, although concrete action has been 
limited to raising a Madhes-based battalion and steps 
such as advertising recruiting drives in languages 
such as Bhojpuri and Maithili. Generals have also 
talked of formulating a new national security policy – 
a necessary step for Nepal’s political leadership but 
perhaps put forward as a delaying tactic in the ab-
sence of any clear and present regional threat. The 
other major parties have offered no policy proposals 
for broader reform. Despite some revision of the leg-
islation governing the army, the legacy of the NC-led 
interim government was a further erosion of the 
minimal oversight that the palace had provided and a 
concerted, if unsuccessful, effort to use the NA for its 
own partisan purposes.91 “Very few care to mention 
the elephant in the room: the Nepalese Army”, one 
commentator noted, and continued: 
The challenge of reforming the Nepalese Army 
will probably be even more complex than rehabili-
tating Maoist combatants. Despite its aggressive 
denials, the army is composed of even more politi-
cally indoctrinated members than the Maoists.… 
The reform of an institution as ossified as the Nep-
alese Army will be long-drawn. More inclusive re-
cruitment policies, better orientation of soldiers 
and socialisation of officers will take time. The 
smooth transition of the military from a Gorkhali 
Army to the modern force of a new federal Nepal 
must underpin Nepal’s democratic future.92 
The NA has taken some steps to broaden its recruiting 
base but has not adopted the quotas that apply to all 
other state bodies. It argues that setting targets would 
mean violating rights: “Recruitment is voluntary and 
competitive. Hence forcing citizens to sign up in the 
proportion of the demographic breakup of the nation 
would violate the rights of the people who may not 
want to join the Army and at the same time be unfair 
to those qualified and wishing to join”.93 Its own sta-
tistics indicate that Brahmans or Chhetris made up 74 
per cent of officer cadet applicants and 85 per cent of 
successful candidates. Madhesis and Tharus, at only 
0.5 per cent in total, are particularly poorly repre-
sented. The suggestion that this results solely from 
“the lack of interest on the part of Madhesi communi-
ties to join military services” seems inadequate.94 In 
 
 
91 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, 
op. cit. 
92 C.K. Lal, “The proletariat and the Praetorian Guard”, 
Nepali Times, 28 March 2008. 
93 Nepalese Army, “State of Inclusiveness in Nepalese 
Army”, at www.nepalarmy.mil.np/inclusiveness.php. 
94 Ibid. 
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any case, the ceasefire-mandated freeze on recruit-
ment should have pushed other reforms further up the 
agenda. Instead, as another analyst points out, the 
“real battle” occupying the attention and energies of 
the NA and others is over control: 
The army has never been as autonomous in its 
functioning as it is now. It would like to retain this 
independence because of its deep distrust for the 
political parties, its antagonism towards the Mao-
ists, and its contempt for the civilian bureaucracy. 
But political control does not mean the Maoists or 
a Maoist minister will control the army. It means 
the Ministry of Defence running the army affairs 
and not being a mere postbox. It means strong all-
party parliamentary defence committees keeping 
an eye on army finances and its professionalism. It 
means regular oversight by the whole cabinet. For 
too long, the army has been in the hands of a tiny 
nexus of generals from the hill elite.95 
There has been one important legal change. The NA, 
like the police and Armed Police Force (APF), will be 
covered by the February 2009 ordinance prescribing 
quotas for recruitment to government services. A total 
of 45 per cent of positions will be reserved for (in de-
scending order of size of allocation) janajatis, Mad-
hesis, women, Dalits and candidates from “backward 
regions”. The ordinance was approved despite UML 
concerns that it was not suitable for the army and that 
army officers should have been consulted.96 
1. Affordability 
Nepal’s bloated security sector places an unsustain-
able burden on overstretched government finances. 
The defence ministry budget, which expert observers 
suggest does not include all expenditure on the NA, 
accounts for over 5 per cent of government spending. 
It is almost on par with that of the home ministry, 
whose functions include not only policing but also the 
nationwide structure of district-level administration, 
and more than four-fifths that of spending on the min-
istry of health and population, which serves some of 
Nepal’s most critical needs.97 
 
 
95 Prashant Jha, “Army amalgamation”, Nepali Times, 24 
October 2008. 
96 Yuvraj Acharya, “Govt to issue 3 ordinances; All govt 
services including army to be inclusive”, myrepublica.com, 5 
February 2009. 
97 Of a total budget of approx. $3 billion, the defence ministry 
receives some $159 million, the home ministry $161 million 
and the ministry of health and population $193 million. Gov-
ernment of Nepal, Budget (2008-2009), at http://www.mof. 
gov.np/publication/speech/2008_1/index.php. 
Despite almost three years of ceasefire, Nepal remains 
one of the region’s most heavily militarised countries. 
While less than one in every 1000 Indian citizens 
serve in the Indian army, Nepal’s ratio is more than 
three times greater – double that of Bangladesh and 
close to that of Pakistan, South Asia’s most army-
dominated state.98 This does not include the Armed 
Police Force or the PLA – either the 19,000 verified 
combatants or the 34,000 in total who continue to be 
paid for by the state.99 One of the few journalists to 
take up the question of affordability has noted: 
Our poor country has been feeding a 92,000-plus 
strong army and an additional 34,000 PLA per-
sonnel (including disqualified ones). The size 
should be reduced as soon as possible to at least a 
pre-insurgency level– that is about 45,000 … whether 
or not the CPA allows new recruitment is less 
relevant here. What is important is, do we need 
any more people in army uniform? Do we need 
more PLA? Or should we use every available op-
portunity to downsize the army and the PLA? The 
army has argued that it needs new recruitment to 
keep its daily functions going. But anyone who has 
seen the army’s vacancy announcement knows that a 
majority of the new recruits will be combatants.100 
Nepal’s donors are footing the bill. It is their aid to 
sectors such as health and education that leaves the 
government free to divert such a generous portion of 
its own resources to the military. Development part-
ners have been remarkably patient in supplying this 
subsidy but the pursuit of more important objectives, 
such as the flagging effort to meet millennium devel-
opment goals on health and education, will bring the 
question of downsizing into sharper focus. Even 
prompt action will do little to reduce the long-term 
strain of a vast army pension budget101 but it can en-
sure valuable financial and human resources are 
channelled into more productive areas.  
 
 
98 These figures are based on 2008 population estimates and 
army figures excluding reservists. Nepalese Army: 95,753; 
population: 29.5 million; 0.32 per cent. Indian army: 1.1 
million (plus 1.2 million reservists); population 1.15 billion; 
0.10 per cent. Bangladesh army: 250,000 (estimate); population: 
150 million (2007 estimate); 0.17 per cent. Pakistan army: 
650,000 (plus 528,000 reservists); population: 172 million 
(2008 estimate); 0.38 per cent. 
99 The expense of maintaining the cantonments and paying 
PLA combatants’ salaries are also not included in the defence 
ministry budget, being instead covered by donor grants ad-
ministered through the ministry of peace and reconstruction. 
100 Ameet Dhakal, “The cost of superficiality”, myrepub-
lica.com, 10 January 2009. 
101 See Artha Beed, “Integrationomics”, Nepali Times, 7 No-
vember 2008. 
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2. Democratic control 
The NA remains a law unto itself and its chief has in-
dicated he will obey orders only insofar as they suit 
him. The army sees itself as answerable to the gov-
ernment but consistently, if subtly, qualifies its will-
ingness to obey orders. Before the election, Chief of 
Army Staff (COAS) General Rookmangud Katwal 
was careful to state that he would obey the orders of a 
“constitutionally elected” government – thereby ex-
cluding the then interim government.102 After the 
Maoist victory, army officers have stressed their pri-
mary responsibility is the protection of the state’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, for which they 
are answerable to the people of Nepal. COAS Katwal 
has publicly stated that the army will only follow “le-
gitimate” orders and will continue to fight against 
“extremism”.103 
The appointment of a Maoist defence minister has not 
led to any visible shift in the government-army rela-
tionship other than an eruption of tensions over the 
question of recruitment. In the two years since the in-
terim constitution’s promulgation, there has been no 
sign of the “extensive work plan for democratisation”. 
The NA has continued to carry out promotions and 
transfers without cabinet approval. On one front there 
has been some formal progress. In January 2009 the 
National Defence Council was finally constituted.104 It 
has yet to start work but its remit is to provide “rec-
ommendations to the Council of Ministers on mobili-
sation, operation and use of the Nepalese Army”.105 
Senior opposition politicians have sought to muddy 
the waters over the question of who controls the army. 
In the words of NC leader Ramchandra Poudel, 
“Nepali Congress will take all necessary steps if Mao-
ists make any attempt to drag Nepalese Army into 
 
 
102 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Land-
scape, op. cit. 
103 “Army Chief says don’t drag NA into controversy”, ekan-
tipur.com, 4 January 2009. 
104 The June 2008 multiparty agreement (Art. 1.3) referred to 
the CA the question of whether an opposition leader should 
be included, noting the disagreement between the CPN(M), 
UML and Janamorcha Nepal (who argued against) and NC, 
CPN(ML) and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
(NSP(A)) (in favour). The interim constitution (Art. 145) had 
stated that the National Defence Council should be chaired 
by the prime minister and include the defence and home 
ministers and three other ministers designated by the prime 
minister. It was amended to specify that the latter three posi-
tions should represent three different parties from among 
those in the council of ministers. Interim Constitution Art. 
145(1)(d), as amended by the fifth amendment, Art. 19. 
105 Interim Constitution, Art. 145. 
politics. According to the interim constitution, it re-
quires the consent of the president on the question of 
any change in the army. The cabinet can only recom-
mend to the president”.106 In fact, the constitution is 
unambiguous. Although the fourth amendment speci-
fied that the president, as supreme commander, would 
manage the army on the recommendation of the coun-
cil of ministers, there is no provision for the president 
to reject the cabinet’s advice unless it is clearly un-
constitutional.107 Army mobilisation for any purpose 
other than natural disaster relief in any case requires 
parliamentary special committee approval, which en-
ables opposition scrutiny and dissent.108 
A row over NA recruitment in late 2008 brought the 
issue into the daylight. The commitment “not to re-
cruit new people in their respective armies” was in-
cluded in the ceasefire code of conduct, while the 
CPA specified that “neither side shall recruit addi-
tional troops”.109 The NA had carried out recruitment 
in 2007 without informing the tripartite Joint Moni-
toring Coordination Committee (JMCC),110 the UN 
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) or the PLA, prompting 
the latter to complain in the JMCC in August 2007. 
However, the defence secretary, then reporting to 
G.P. Koirala, who held the defence portfolio, backed 
the NA.111 The NA argues that recruits to fill vacant 
positions up to its strength at the time of the ceasefire 
do not constitute “additional troops”, although they 
are certainly “new people”. 
The argument is political rather than legal. Those pre-
sent at the AMMAA negotiations report that the ques-
tion of recruiting to fill vacancies was explicitly 
discussed and not agreed, in accordance with the let-
 
 
106 Interview, Spotlight, 9 January 2009. 
107 144(2): “The Council of Ministers shall appoint the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nepalese Army [amended: (2) 
The words ‘by the Council of Ministers’ in Clause (2) have 
been replaced by the words ‘by the President on the recom-
mendation of the Council of Ministers’]”. 144(3): “The 
Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the 
Nepalese Army in accordance with the law [amended (3) 
The words ‘the Council of Ministers shall’ in Clause (3) 
have been replaced by the words ‘the President shall on the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers’]”. 
108 145(5): “Except in the case of mobilization of the Nepal-
ese Army because of natural calamities, the decision made 
by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Nepal for 
the mobilization of the army shall be presented to a special 
committee prescribed by the Legislature-Parliament within a 
month of the decision, and be approved accordingly”. 
109 Ceasefire Code of Conduct Art. 3; CPA Art. 5.1.2 
110 The JMCC, established by the AMMAA, brings together 
NA and PLA representatives under UN convenorship. 
111 Briefing by Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General in Nepal, UN Security Council, 16 January 2009. 
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ter and spirit of the ceasefire code of conduct. 
UNMIN’s position on this has been consistent.112 
Supporters of the NA, however, are unlikely to be 
swayed by the requirements of the peace deals, how-
ever much they bemoan UNMIN’s inability to en-
force other parts of the agreements. As one columnist 
argues, the “changed circumstances” following the 
election (specifically, having a Maoist prime minister 
and defence minister) are more important than the let-
ter and spirit of the peace agreement.113 
In November 2008 the NA again embarked on re-
cruitment without informing the JMCC, UNMIN or 
the PLA, prompting the UN SRSG to issue a state-
ment in the face of PLA threats to undertake new re-
cruitment themselves. As both witness to the 
AMMAA and convenor of the JMCC, UNMIN’s pub-
lic reiteration of the content of agreements might ap-
pear uncontroversial but was taken by some as a 
deliberate effort to undermine the NA: 
UNMIN’s Ian Martin has declared that any re-
cruitment by parties to the Comprehensive Peace 
Accord (CPA) violates the letter and spirit of the 
Agreement on Monitoring and Management of 
Arms and Armies that his team is committed to 
ensure. This is as clear an espousal of the Maoist 
cause as is prudentially possible for the UN. 
Whether the position of UNMIN constitutes a 
breach of protocol or merely violates accepted 
norms of diplomatic decency is for Foreign Minis-
ter Upendra Yadav to decide.114 
The Maoist handling of the controversy was confused 
and inept. Despite their longstanding refusal to accept 
any NA recruitment and their control of the defence 
ministry, they allowed the process to carry on for sev-
eral weeks before crying foul. The recruiting was 
hardly carried out in secret: vacancies were promi-
 
 
112 “Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, has written to the Minister of Defence, reiterating 
UNMIN’s view that any new recruitment by the Nepalese 
Army or the Maoist army would be a breach of the Ceasefire 
Code of Conduct, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and 
Armies. UNMIN had expressed this view to the previous 
Government in the context of earlier reports of new recruit-
ment by the Nepalese Army in 2007, and had also drawn the 
attention of the Minister of Defence in the current Govern-
ment to its position. The previous Government had main-
tained that the Nepalese Army could fill vacancies up to its 
standing strength at the time of the signing of the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement”. UNMIN, press statement, 23 
December 2008. 
113 C.K. Lal, “It is Nepal’s army”, Nepali Times, 9 January 2009. 
114 Ibid. 
nently advertised in the media, including state-owned 
newspapers, and selection camps had been established 
in several locations, attracting almost 50,000 appli-
cants. The UCPN(M)’s belated complaints were fur-
ther undermined by contradictory statements from its 
leaders suggesting there was no clear party, or gov-
ernment, line.115 
The army’s understanding of an acceptable level of 
democratic control is not one that most other militar-
ies would recognise. “Of course we are happy with 
having a ministry of defence”, explained one senior 
officer. “As long as it understands that its only duty is 
to endorse whatever our headquarters tells it to. It’s 
too early to have our officers messing around with 
politicians – maybe in ten years’ time”.116 Gentle 
nudges from sympathetic donors have been brushed 
off; the UK’s efforts to support capacity building in 
the ministry of defence have been quietly but system-
atically thwarted. “There is currently no sign of any 
political will to grip the generals, or to build the ca-
pacity to make civilian control of the military a reality 
– both essential foundations for a democratic state”, 
warned a retired British general. “The rarity of 
meaningful discussion on the subject is just one 
measure of the size of the task and of the moral 
courage required to champion its urgency and 
importance”.117 
3. Accountability 
Meaningful democratic control would not only mean 
taking orders from civilians but would also entail 
budgetary accountability. As the author of the only 
recent book-length study of the (then) Royal Nepalese 
Army (RNA), retired Indian Maj.-Gen. Ashok Mehta, 
explained: 
Since officers are poorly paid, corruption is ram-
pant at various levels, especially at the very top. 
Indian military equipment is not popular because 
there are no kickbacks. A number of local factories 
producing clothing, boots, etc, were closed down 
so that these items could be ‘profitably’ imported. 
Over-invoicing is rampant and the quality of ra-
tions very poor.…The ostentatious lifestyles of 
many retired generals seem well beyond their ac-
countable income.118 
 
 
115 For example, look at conflicting Mahara and Badal 
statements. 
116 Crisis Group interview, October 2008. 
117 Sam Cowan, “The Lost Battles of Khara and Pili”, Himal 
Southasian, September 2008. 
118 Ashok Mehta, The Royal Nepalese Army: Meeting the 
Maoist Challenge (Delhi, 2005), pp. 43-44. 
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The only thing that has changed since April 2006 is 
that the palace no longer oversees this habitual cor-
ruption. The interim government was happy to turn a 
blind eye, the Maoist defence minister has shown no 
indication he wants to grasp this nettle and few inde-
pendent observers dare speak out publicly. In one rare 
example, a Nepali daily’s frontpage story enumerated 
a litany of scams, from the grandiose to the petty. At 
the upper end of the scale, the Army Welfare Fund 
issued a letter of credit to purchase eleven Chinese 
armoured personnel carriers for $5.5 million; the ve-
hicles, for which no tender was issued, were report-
edly destined for a possible peacekeeping mission in 
Sudan that has not materialised.119 Large contracts for 
trousers, shirts, woollen vests and bags were also 
awarded without tenders, an order for 30,000 boots 
that rejected the lowest offer for one more than a third 
more expensive was justified on the grounds that 
boots are “of strategic importance”.120 A seasoned 
economics columnist observed: 
For decades, the Nepalese Army has managed to 
stay outside the normal accountability structure – 
not due to lack of procedures but the [manner] in 
which it operated, especially with the Supreme 
Commander (the king), the accountability institu-
tion of last resort. The prime minister generally took 
the ceremonial Defence Ministry and Palace Af-
fairs which literally meant that there were no com-
petencies or systems to regulate the army. The Auditor 
General’s offices paid token visits to look through 
army accounts, and accountability was minimal. 
Even the Army Welfare Fund, that belonged not to 
the state but the army personnel and their families, 
could get away from disclosure obligations.121 
Such arrangements surely boost the morale of the sen-
ior officers allowed to dip their hands in the till with 
impunity. They do little, however, to support an insti-
tution-wide esprit de corps. Maj.-Gen. Mehta sug-
gested a link between corruption and an 
organisational culture which does little to foster good 
relations between ranks to the detriment of opera-
tional effectiveness: “Few Nepalese have the courage 
to admit that RNA lacks offensive spirit – that it does 
not have the stomach to fight. Senior leadership is 
considered professionally inept, JCOs infirm and offi-
cers at junior command levels bereft of guid-
ance.…There is also no concrete concept of welfare, 
 
 
119 Parshuram Kafle, “Armed Personnel Carriers worth NPR 
400 million purchased without tender”, Naya Patrika, 19 
June 2008. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Artha Beed, “Integrationomics”, Nepali Times, 7 Novem-
ber 2008. 
motivation and camaraderie. Corruption is rampant 
especially at higher echelons and morale low among 
the rank and file”.122 This assessment by a sympa-
thetic fellow professional suggests that greater ac-
countability would enhance, rather than detract from, 
professionalism. The government appears to have 
made one move towards increased oversight, with a 
15 January 2009 cabinet regulation on the Army Wel-
fare Fund which reportedly includes a 22 per cent cap 
on the salary deductions of troops on UN peacekeep-
ing operations that flow to it.123 
4. Impunity 
Since the ceasefire, solid evidence of war crimes 
committed during the conflict has been collated. Both 
warring parties regularly violated international hu-
manitarian law, most notably the Geneva Conven-
tions. Furthermore, the thorough investigations of the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) have strongly suggested RNA offi-
cers were responsible for crimes against humanity, a 
category of grave offences that are viewed as contra-
vening customary international law, which binds all 
states.124 No action has been taken by successive gov-
ernments, the courts or NA, police or PLA command-
ers to investigate these crimes.125 In contrast, the 
culture of condoning cover-ups continues unabated. 
Violations were both systematic and systemic. The 
distinction in the terms is important. Abuses were sys-
tematic in their execution: planned, sustained, en-
dorsed by commanders and following a fairly 
consistent pattern. They were systemic, on both sides, 
in that they stemmed from institutional cultures which 
refused to recognise crimes as crimes and resisted any 
form of investigation or prosecution. Even as their ef-
fects live on for victims, their families and wider 
communities, systematic war crimes are in the past. 
 
 
122 Ashok Mehta, The Royal Nepalese Army, op. cit., p. 71. 
123 Ananta Raj Luitel, “NA welfare fund spending made 
transparent”, The Himalayan Times, 26 January 2009. 
124 The Accountability Watch Committee, a domestic body 
bringing together many of the most respected human rights 
activists, found that the OHCHR Bardiya report “presents a 
wealth of evidence that the acts of disappearance during Ne-
pal’s armed conflict were crimes against humanity. It has 
recommended the Government of Nepal to conduct criminal 
investigations of these crimes and prosecutions”. Press re-
lease, Kathmandu, 20 December 2008. 
125 The NA has, by its own account, sentenced 66 personnel 
for human rights violations with penalties ranging from im-
prisonment to discharge or demotion. It is not, however, able 
to release any information on individual cases. Nepalese 
Army Headquarters, email communication, February 2009. 
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The systemic failings which enabled them to happen 
remain, however, very much a matter of the present. 
Immediate investigation and redress for every viola-
tion is impossible but the peace process offers a 
unique opportunity to introduce a change in culture. 
An unaccountable and predatory security sector that 
exploits citizens rather than protecting them is 
unlikely to contribute to lasting peace or stability. 
Whatever the shape of any deal on PLA integration 
and NA democratisation, these twin procedures offer 
the chance to signal a clear change in direction. 
Screening all personnel to identify those on both sides 
suspected of grave abuses, including at the command 
level, and filtering them out of a reconstituted na-
tional army would be a minimal first step towards re-
building a respectable state force.  
V. THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES 
A. REBUILDING THE PEACE PROCESS 
1. Consensus and confidence 
Conditions for cooperation are more strained than 
ever but there are no viable alternatives to working 
together. The UCPN(M) must reach out to the NC 
which, in turn, must stop spoiling for spoiling’s sake. 
The UML can still play a crucial mediating role if it 
resists the calls from both sides to help a process of 
polarisation. These three parties must jointly recog-
nise the need to respect the changed political configu-
ration since the elections – not only the CPN(M) 
victory but the fact that other parties, led by the MJF, 
represent significant constituencies whose active col-
laboration in governance and constitution-writing is 
essential. 
Calls for polarisation represent a fundamental chal-
lenge to day-to-day governance and the concept of 
consensus as the basis for constitutional process. The 
move away from consensus was initiated in response 
to the surprise Maoist electoral victory. The NC insisted 
on dismantling part of the constitutional requirement 
for consensus by pushing for the simple majoritarian 
government/opposition structure which was instituted 
by the fourth and fifth amendments to the interim 
constitution.126 (Maoist leaders eventually agreed to 
this concession but insist they have not been slow to 
reach out to other parties, for example by offering the 
UML, specifically former leader Madhav Nepal, 
chairmanship of the constitution-drafting committee 
from the outset.127) Appointments to all positions – 
from the president and prime minister to the CA 
speaker and deputy and the chairs of drafting commit-
tees – are now decided by elections, even if some of 
the latter were in effect settled through negotiation. 
Maoist Finance Minister Baburam Bhattarai has re-
sisted the call for polarisation: “We have a consensus 
on fundamental democratic principles like multiparty 
competition, human rights, rule of law and so on.…A 
majority government and minority opposition invites 
 
 
126 The fourth amendment, passed late on the night of the 
CA’s first sitting, provided for the appointment and removal 
of the prime minister by a simple majority of CA members, 
rather than the existing consensus model with a two-thirds 
threshold for a no-confidence motion. The fifth amendment, 
passed on 15 July 2008, further amended Art. 36B (to enable 
the election of the president) and Art. 71 (to elect the CA 
speaker and deputy speaker). 
127 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, December 2008 
and January 2009.  
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instability, which is what is happening now when 
what we need is a political consensus”.128 Speaking at 
the CA as the committee chairs were to be appointed, 
Prachanda similarly reiterated the need for consensus. 
But the rhetoric from elsewhere in the Maoist move-
ment has grown progressively more militant.129  
Much of the more extreme language from political 
leaders may be posturing, playing to the balcony 
within their own parties and attention-seeking. It does 
not all have to be taken at face value, especially in the 
context of jostling for leadership positions and other 
intra-party battles which encourage heightened rheto-
ric. Many individual leaders may be persuaded to 
drop public criticism in return for personal prefer-
ment. It is too late to offer G.P. Koirala the presi-
dency but the appointment of Madhav Nepal to head 
the constitutional committee indicates the potential 
for co-opting powerful individual leaders. 
2. A fresh start? 
There have been suggestions, including from the 
prime minister, that the breakdown in trust calls for a 
new deal. Renegotiating the CPA, or reopening de-
bate on its fundamental elements, is fraught with dan-
ger: there is no scope to forge a new agreement and 
undermining the authority of the existing framework 
could destroy what consensus remains. Behind-the-
scenes efforts between the major parties that initially 
framed the process are keeping channels for construc-
tive dialogue open and maintaining some of the coop-
erative spirit of the early negotiations. But the June 
2008 multiparty promise that “consensus and coop-
eration will be both fostered and adopted in order to 
make progress on building the constitution”130 was ei-
ther insincere or not robust and detailed enough to 
withstand the further erosion of confidence. 
There are, however, grounds for a new statement of 
political intent. The major principles on which the 
peace process was built were set out in the November 
2005 twelve-point agreement – a document designed 
to forge a joint anti-monarchical struggle rather than a 
far-sighted declaration of common cause. More sig-
nificantly, the principal agreements were drawn up 
and signed by a limited number of parties. The CA 
election showed they did not represent as broad a 
spectrum of public opinion as they had assumed. A 
 
 
128 Interview, Nepali Times, 9 January 2009. 
129 See, for example, “Janajagaranle tuphani abhiyanma 
pratigamiharu badharine”, Janadesh, 23 December 2008. 
130 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the 
Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June 
2008, Art. 7.4. 
new charter with the MJF and other significant parties 
on board might better represent the more inclusive 
shape the peace process, and government, has assumed. 
Rebuilding a minimum common understanding on the 
fundamentals of the peace process remains possible 
and does not have to mean the reduction of all poli-
cies to the lowest common denominator. Consensus is 
necessary to complete the commitments of the CPA 
and the writing of the constitution but not for gov-
ernment business. The UCPN(M) has a popular and 
constitutional mandate to lead the government. Day-
to-day governance and the formulation of policies not 
directly related to the peace process is the collective 
responsibility of the UCPN(M) and its coalition part-
ners. They do not have to submit executive decisions 
to consultation beyond the oversight that the legisla-
ture already provides – although this should not be an 
excuse for using ordinances to bypass parliamentary 
scrutiny, however temporarily. What is important is a 
fresh impetus for the peace process and clear, realistic 
public commitments by all players on how they will 
behave and what goals they will jointly pursue. 
3. Mechanisms and monitoring 
Agreement in principle will not translate into imple-
mentation in practice without appropriate structures in 
place. The first must be an overarching political coor-
dination mechanism, in which all major parties can 
assess progress, air disagreements, discuss priorities 
and the means to achieve them and maintain a basic 
shared agenda. It should have the mandate and capac-
ity to keep the process moving forward, manage dis-
putes and have sufficient secretariat support to make 
informed decisions, whose implementation can be 
monitored and evaluated. It must also be inclusive 
and authoritative – with sufficiently high-level repre-
sentation that top party leaders cannot circumvent it 
and second-rank leaders cannot publicly undermine it. 
For now, the CA’s constitutional committee is the 
main mechanism for high-level political dialogue as it 
includes most major party leaders. However, it has a 
specific remit and is unable to tackle broader peace 
process-related issues. At the local level, the lack of 
mechanisms is even more stark. Before the election, 
the seven-party grouping had functioned, however 
imperfectly in some cases, as a confidence and con-
sensus-building mechanism, as had regular meetings 
convened by district election officials. The absence of 
any such structures has contributed to a worsening of 
local inter-party relationships and adds to the urgency 
of establishing all-party local government bodies and 
broader-based peace committees. 
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At a lower level, the thematic bodies called for by the 
CPA, and others as necessary, must be established 
and made functional. Such mechanisms should allow 
for a sensible measure of delegation. The concentra-
tion of all discussion and decision-making in the 
hands of a few senior leaders has serious practical, as 
well as political, implications. With all contentious 
issues forced into one narrow bottleneck, disagree-
ment on one question can easily stall progress on 
many others. Top leaders do not have the time or se-
cretariat support to examine complex topics in suffi-
cient detail to reach workable solutions. To take only 
the question of the return of seized land, for example, 
there is not even a central register of the property in 
question, let alone a detailed breakdown of current 
occupants and options for resettlement or compensa-
tion. The multiple challenges demanding immediate 
consideration have to be dealt with in series, rather 
than in parallel. Finally, compromises depend too 
much on personal relations and individual interests: 
fine if trading favours can smooth the path to a prin-
cipled agreement but too often reducing serious deci-
sions to the soothing of inflated egos in shabby 
closed-door trade-offs. 
A solid, impartial monitoring mechanism is essential. 
Many of the allegations publicly traded between par-
ties appear to have little basis in fact. But in the ab-
sence of objective monitoring, political discussions 
are destined to remain divorced from reality. For ex-
ample, there is no reliable way of gauging whether the 
YCL is becoming more or less active, intimidating or 
totalitarian in its behaviour. Some indicators, from 
their apparently lower public presence in urban areas 
to donor reports that the drive to seize development 
tenders has subsided, suggest the YCL has scaled 
back its activities. Political opponents, however, ar-
gue the reverse. 
The peace deal was never backed by a coherent ap-
proach to monitoring. The Ceasefire Code of Conduct 
called for oversight “by national and international 
monitoring teams”131 but the national body established 
was ineffective and rapidly dissolved. The 8 Novem-
ber 2006 government-Maoist summit that paved the 
way for the CPA promised a “high-level committee 
… to monitor if the agreements have been imple-
mented”132 but the CPA itself contained no general 
monitoring provision.133 The December 2007 23-point 
 
 
131 Ceasefire Code of Conduct, Art. 21. 
132 SPA-Maoist agreement, 8 November 2006, Art. V.1. 
133 It requested OHCHR and the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) to monitor human rights, UNMIN to 
monitor arms and armies’ management and the UN to moni-
tor the CA elections but contained no mention of monitoring 
agreement introduced more specific mechanisms but 
none was activated.134 The government’s own policies 
and programs document only adds to the confusion, 
suggesting a possible conflation of the peace, truth 
and reconciliation and disappearance commissions: 
“Regarding a high-level Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission [that would] investigate into and make 
public the cases of those who have been disappeared, 
as per the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, a separate Commission shall be created. 
The Commission’s reports [and recommendations] 
shall be actively implemented”.135 
The June 2008 agreement specifically called for a 
mechanism to supervise the Maoist pledges on chang-
ing YCL behaviour: “A monitoring committee that 
includes representatives from the political parties, 
human-rights defenders and local administration will 
be established, in order to monitor whether this 
[promise] has been implemented”.136 No such com-
mittee has yet been established. A similarly unful-
filled pledge was to set up a parallel monitoring 
committee on the return of seized property.137 The 
UCPN(M)’s failure to fulfil its promises is clear. 
 
 
arrangements for the deal as a whole. CPA Part 9 “Imple-
mentation and Monitoring”. It did establish a National Peace 
and Rehabilitation Commission to assist in “normalisation of 
the difficult situation that arose as a result of the armed con-
flict” (Art. 5.2.4) and empowered it to “set up necessary 
mechanisms for the success of the peace campaign” (Art. 
8.2) but left dispute resolution to an undefined “joint mecha-
nism comprising both sides” (Art. 10.4). 
134 This included a High-Level Committee for Monitoring 
the Effective Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Accord and other Agreements and a High-Level Peace 
Commission; formation of the latter apparently remains on 
the agenda. Until the formation of the High-Level Peace 
Commission, a Peace and Conflict Management Committee, 
composed of civil society and party representatives, was to 
serve as an alternative interim body. In October 2008 it met 
and decided to review the implementation of all peace proc-
ess commitments from the twelve-point agreement onwards 
but does not appear to have completed this review. 
135 Policies and Programmes of the Government of the Re-
public of Nepal, 11 September 2008. The government also 
announced it would form the following commissions: High-
Level Scientific Land Reform Commission, National Labour 
Commission, Administration Restructuring Commission, 
National Dalit Commission, National Women’s Commis-
sion, National Muslim Commission. 
136 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the 
Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June 
2008, Art. 3. 
137 “A central-level monitoring committee, which includes 
representatives from the political parties, will be formed to 
monitor the implementation [of this point]”. “Agreement be-
tween the political parties to amend the Constitution and take 
forward the peace process”, 25 June 2008, Art. 4. 
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Other parties’ preference has been to pursue the issue 
solely through the media rather than through pressure 
to establish the promised committees. The CA’s 19 
January 2009 formation of an eleven-member cross-
party committee to monitor the government’s imple-
mentation of its promises to meet NC demands is an 
example of steps that can be taken within the legisla-
ture to involve parties in holding their peers to account. 
Some state and non-governmental bodies do provide 
monitoring functions. For instance, the NHRC tracks 
human rights violations, the peace ministry 
coordinates claims for compensation and a variety of 
professional bodies and NGOs follow areas within 
their own mandates. But none of this adds up to a 
coordinated and neutral monitoring of peace process 
implementation. The major parties and opinion-
formers have consistently opposed a substantive 
international role so the solution must be a national 
body with a broadly acceptable, respected 
membership and sufficient administrative and 
political support to carry out its role effectively. 
Peacebuilding is not just a matter of forging high-
level political consensus. In many respects, the more 
critical tasks of dealing with the conflict legacy and 
rebuilding communities’ cohesion must take at the lo-
cal level. Here too, the failure of planned mechanisms 
has taken its toll. Local elections are not likely until 
after the constitutional process is completed, and in-
terim measures to establish alternative local govern-
ment structures are stalled over questions of political 
representation. The July 2008 constitutional revision 
called for the government, until local elections can be 
held, to “formulate an interim body at the district, 
municipality and village levels, with the participation 
and consensus of those political parties active at the 
local level”.138 Local peace committees (LPCs), first 
discussed in July 2006, and formally endorsed by the 
CPA,139 would at least bring together parties and civil 
society representatives to foster reconciliation, dialogue 
and peacebuilding at the local level. However, their 
establishment has been dogged by political wrangling, 
their functioning sporadic and their impact minimal.140 
 
 
138 Interim Constitution, Art. 139(2) as amended by the Fifth 
Amendment, 15 July 2008. An explanatory note clarifies: 
“In this Sub-article, ‘political parties active at the local level’ 
shall refer to those parties represented in the Constituent As-
sembly, and to those parties that filed for candidacy in the 
relevant districts under the first-past-the-post system”. 
139 CPA Art. 8.3. 
140 The peace ministry almost got the scheme off the ground 
in September 2007 but was stymied by political disagree-
ment. The High-Level Peace Commission called for by the 
December 2007 23-point agreement could have overseen the 
Emphasising the practicalities of process is nothing 
new. But just because the case has been made, and 
ignored, repeatedly does not mean it is false. It also bears 
repeating that the peace process has seen only one 
successful monitoring body so far, the JMCC. It re-
mains functional and has contributed significantly to 
reducing the risk of direct NA-PLA tensions.141 It meets 
regularly, has an agenda and is professionally supported. 
Its tripartite format – with the UN included as witness 
to the AMMAA that established it – is not replicable 
elsewhere in the process. Nevertheless, the successful 
aspects of its functioning should not be ignored. 
In parallel, the other success story is the Election 
Commission, which all parties praised for its techni-
cal efficiency and political impartiality. It offers a 
model for a potential monitoring body. Its constitu-
tionally mandated independence, coupled with the re-
spect earned by its chief commissioner, kept it above 
the political fray. Its representatives in each district 
were a conduit for complaints by parties about rivals’ 
behaviour and they brought conflicting parties to-
gether to discuss alleged violations and resolve low-
level disputes. It collected and channelled information 
and served as a focal point for higher level discus-
sions in Kathmandu without becoming detached from 
ground realities. Most high-profile commissions (in-
cluding the ceasefire monitoring commission) adopt a 
top-down approach: the energy devoted to selecting 
and balancing civil society luminaries to head the 
body is rarely matched by attention to support struc-
tures. Successful monitoring might benefit from the 
reverse: careful consideration of nationwide day-to-
day presence coming before the selection of capable, 
neutral figures to provide oversight. 
B. GETTING A GRIP ON GOVERNANCE 
1. Policy priorities 
Despite the large popular mandate for change and a 
clear majority for leftist parties who have long es-
poused people’s empowerment and radical transfor-
mation, the government does not communicate policy 
priorities that meet such goals. People’s expectations 
 
 
plan but it was never constituted; the interim Peace and Con-
flict Management Committee (formed one week before the 
CA election) never had clear terms of reference. Neverthe-
less, LPCs were formed in 33 districts but were largely inef-
fective, while an October 2008 rewriting of their terms of 
reference by the Maoist-led peace ministry was criticised for 
placing all power in the hands of the CPN(M). 
141 There was little it could do about the recruitment row as 
the NA did not meet the obligation to inform the JMCC. 
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may be tempered by experience but aspirations that 
this government will deliver concrete benefits are 
high. The budget, the most extensive and thoroughly 
developed statement of government intent, does set 
three major policy priorities: completion of the peace 
process and immediate relief; accelerated economic 
growth; and social security and inclusion.142 
However, if a coherent strategy for economic and so-
cial development exists, it does not appear to be 
shared by the governing parties, let alone communi-
cated to other development partners and the public at 
large. Ministerial in-trays have, like the newspaper 
headlines, been dominated by unforeseen difficulties 
such as the electricity generation crisis. The govern-
ment has been reacting to events rather than shaping 
and selling a longer-term agenda. With so much focus 
on immediate concerns, continuing rapid population 
growth and its implications are not receiving enough 
attention. In particular, Nepal’s youth is a critical con-
stituency. Already limited higher education and voca-
tional training options and dismal domestic job prospects 
will be exacerbated if the global slowdown reduces 
overseas employment. If prompt steps are not taken to 
mitigate such problems, disaffection will generate po-
litical pressure and add to instability. 
2. Public security 
The state of law and order is weak and threatens the 
completion of the peace process. Poor public security 
reduces trust in the state and the political leadership, 
as well as undermining development efforts and the 
delivery of basic services. Ongoing instability in the 
Tarai is a real and imminent concern.143 Tarai districts 
have seen the worst effects of lawlessness, suffering 
from a combination of armed political protest, organ-
ised crime and weak policing. Negotiations with vari-
ous armed groups have been taking place but do not 
appear to add up to a coherent strategy. Opposition 
complaints that the major national parties have no in-
terest in improving Madhesis’ lives reflect a genuine 
discontent.144 
 
 
142 Budget speech (English version), pp. 8-9. It also set sec-
toral priorities: transformation of the agriculture sector; de-
velopment of water resources; wider expansion of tourism; 
qualitative development and expansion of physical infra-
structure; human resources development; national industri-
alisation. Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
143 Daulat Jha, “The chilly winter ahead”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 23 December 2008. 
144 “Maoists, NC, UML united against Madhes: Tripathi”, 
interview with Hridayesh Tripathi, The Himalayan Times, 23 
December 2008. 
While still alarming, however, nationwide statistics 
show a clear reduction in the worst forms of crime 
since their peaks in early 2008.145 In the Kathmandu 
valley, there was a more dramatic drop in serious of-
fences during the second half of 2008, with murders 
and kidnappings halved compared to the same period 
in 2007.146 In the eastern Tarai there was a spike in 
killings from December 2008, at least partially attrib-
utable to the heavy-handed actions of additional po-
lice units deployed in the area, who have killed at 
least seven people in “crossfire” since 19 December. 
Extra police forces may be part of the solution but lo-
cal populations need a qualitative, not just quantita-
tive, change in policing. Building trust in the police 
will take time. With 45 per cent reserved quotas for 
different marginalised groups in new recruitment, the 
police have at least taken preliminary steps to build-
ing a more balanced profile. Longer-term measures 
should centre on community policing and local ac-
countability. A home ministry task force on public se-
curity, headed by respected law professor Yubaraj 
Sangroula, has started broad-based consultations to 
develop proposals. For now, the government needs to 
temper strength with sensitivity, ensuring the goal of 
day-to-day law and order for ordinary residents is not 
eclipsed by the urge either to cut deals with shadowy 
armed groups or to resort to the counterproductive 
short cut of extrajudicial killings. 
3. Guiding international assistance 
For donors there is a natural temptation to revert to 
business as usual, if all appears to be normal, or to 
withdraw, if development seems frustratingly impos-
sible. So far, Nepal’s major development partners 
have managed to steer a middle course but they are in 
urgent need of clear guidance from the government on 
its priorities. The weaknesses of external supply-
driven aid agendas have been thoroughly exposed: lit-
tle local ownership, huge wastage and corruption and 
few lasting benefits. “We don’t want to repeat that”, 
 
 
145 There were 259 killings in the first half of 2008 and 181 
in the second half. The peak was in the aftermath of the elec-
tion, with 45 killings in April, 48 in May and 50 in June. A 
spike in December (32 killings) was attributable solely to 
violence in the central and eastern Tarai; other parts of the 
country saw a continuing downward trend. Reported bomb 
blasts fell more or less consistently from 66 in January 2008 
to thirteen in November, with another central and eastern Ta-
rai spike pushing the total to 23 in December. “Nepal: Re-
ports of Security Incidents - 1 January to 31 December, 
2008”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs, Kathmandu, at www.un.org.np. 
146 “Crime slumps in Valley”, The Kathmandu Post, 13 
January 2009. 
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says one donor. “We’d like the government to tell us 
how to help and fall in line with its priorities – that’s 
the only way our input will be meaningful”.147 
Large sums are at stake. The budget was attacked for 
expecting unrealistic increases in foreign grants and 
loans but growth is possible. The UN Peacebuilding 
Fund has offered a new $10 million contribution to 
supporting the peace process.148 The UN has launched 
a $115 million humanitarian transition appeal for 
2009 under the consolidated appeals process that 
brings together UN agencies, governmental and non-
governmental development and relief agencies.149 It 
notes that the peace process is incomplete and “the 
conflict’s residual impact has weakened social safety 
nets, causing a lack of basic services”. It also intro-
duces an “exit strategy” for humanitarian actors, “tar-
geting ‘transition’ not only from war to peace but 
from international to local actors”. 
Assistance to the peace process per se is a difficult 
area. The government would prefer donors to 
contribute to its peace fund, leaving it free to allocate 
resources and oversee their use. As the experience of 
the repeated six-month extensions of UNMIN’s 
mandate has shown, politicians are extremely 
reluctant to call for help, however much they may 
privately wish to. This reluctance has in particular 
been conditioned by India’s strongly expressed 
distaste for any UN role beyond arms monitoring. In 
his final briefing as UN SRSG, Ian Martin noted: 
If I have one particular regret, it is that the parties 
did not take up our offer in late 2007 that the United 
Nations could assist by supporting the implemen-
tation of peace process commitments more gener-
ally than in the case of arms monitoring alone. It 
 
 
147 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
148 “Secretary-General Approves $10 Million Contribution 
In Aid To Nepal”, UN General Assembly press release 
SG/2141 PBC/41, 9 September 2008. This assistance will be 
channelled through an existing funding mechanism, the UN 
Peace Fund for Nepal, managed by representatives from the 
UN, the government and the donor community. “Areas that 
are strong candidates for support include: support to Nepal’s 
Constituent Assembly and promotion of human rights and 
protection; recovery of communities and areas affected by 
conflict, for example, through ‘food and cash for work pro-
grammes’, school feeding projects, skills training for youth 
and other initiatives that accelerate the tangible benefits of 
peace and development; and conflict prevention and recon-
ciliation issues, for example, assistance to cantonments and 
reintegration of former combatants and internally displaced 
persons or support to land and property mediation”. 
149 “Nepal Humanitarian Transition Appeal 2009”, United 
Nations, at www.humanitarianappeal.net. 
could, for example, have assisted the impartial 
monitoring and implementation of the return of 
property, which has been a constant impediment to 
political cooperation. This would in no way have 
detracted from the fact that the peace process has 
always been a Nepalese process or infringed upon 
national sovereignty. The parties have not made 
full use of what the United Nations has to offer, 
notwithstanding their recognition that UNMIN’s 
presence has had a value well beyond its specific 
electoral and arms monitoring functions.150 
The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UK 
Department for International Development, which are 
all preparing medium-term assistance strategies, have 
some $1.5 billion available for the next three years. 
All appear willing to follow a government lead; like 
other donors, they have also gradually embraced the 
need for broader consultations with non-governmental 
stakeholders, from local communities to civil society 
organisations. 
Harnessing available international funds effectively 
and lobbying for increases depends on the govern-
ment. It can set priorities and should be the first stop 
for coordination. Success stories in areas such as 
revenue collection impress donors and boost the state’s 
authority but have yet to add up to a strategy for shap-
ing international engagement. Aid-givers also need more 
solid reassurances that mechanisms such as the Nepal 
Peace Trust Fund are properly managed and audited.151 
The proposed Nepal Development Forum in May 
2009 will be a useful focal point only if priorities and 
options for further funding are agreed in advance. 
Donors themselves face difficult choices. Poor 
coordination has led to a profusion of similar 
programs in certain areas – women CA members, for 
example, are overwhelmed by the demands of 
competing donor capacity-building projects in gender 
promotion – while preparations for technical 
assistance to constitution-writing and security sector 
reform are of limited use until the processes they are 
designed to support get under way. Decisions on 
sensitive topics such as social inclusion, federalism, 
PLA integration and public security are not only a 
matter of high politics: all will require significant 
resources to implement solutions. Planning such 
assistance without becoming involved in the political 
debate calls for sensitivity, and restraint in proposing 
external models. 
 
 
150 Briefing by Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General in Nepal, UN Security Council, 16 January 2009. 
151 The NPTF moved to ministry of peace and reconstruction 
control in December 2008; its functioning has been hard to 
evaluate so far. 
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C. CONSTITUTION-WRITING 
The constitutional process has in effect yet to start, 
although there have been some positive develop-
ments. The CA has agreed its rules of procedure and 
elected a speaker and deputy speaker and has fulfilled 
its legislative function, when it works as parliament. 
On the constitution-drafting front, progress has been 
slower but not entirely stalled. On 14 November 
2008, the CA agreed and published a timetable for its 
activities, vowing to complete the new statute by 28 
May 2010 – the limit of the constitutionally stipulated 
two-year timeframe.152 It is already behind schedule: 
the CA’s budget session, due to finish by mid-
December 2008, wrapped up 34 days late. 
The timetable is tight, leaving little room for slippage. 
For example, public opinion on “concept papers” is to 
be gathered only until 26 February 2009 but no con-
cept papers have yet been published. The public will 
then be invited to comment on a full draft between 
September and December 2009 but the CA has allot-
ted itself just four days, in January 2010, to consider 
public input.153 CA committees were established on 
15 December: a 61-member constitutional committee 
with overall drafting responsibility; ten thematic 
committees mandated to prepare drafts under their 
subject areas and finalise procedures;154 and three 
procedural committees dealing with areas including 
public consultation.155 In breach of the timetable’s 
first deadline, chairpersons were not selected.156 Still, 
most chairs were eventually allocated through cross-
 
 
152 On the process see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Consti-
tutional Process, op. cit. The interim constitution gives the 
CA two years to complete its work, with a possible six-
month extension in case of a “declaration of an emergency 
situation”. Interim constitution, Art. 64. 
153 “Calendar for constitution writing determined, new con-
stitution by May, 2010”, nepalnews.com, 16 November 2008. 
154 These are the fundamental rights and directive principle 
committee, committee to protect the rights of minority and 
marginal communities, state restructuring and state power 
allocation committee, committee to finalise the structure of 
the organs of the legislature, committee to finalise the shape 
of the administrative structure of the state, committee on ju-
dicial system, committee to fix the structure of the constitu-
tional bodies, committee on natural resources, economic 
rights and revenue allocation, committee on finalising the 
basis of cultural and social solidarity and committee on na-
tional interest protection. 
155 These are the civil relations committee, collection of peo-
ple’s opinion and coordination committee and capability in-
creasing and resource management committee. 
156 Liladhar Upadhyaya, “Constitution writing process takes 
off”, The Rising Nepal, 16 December 2008. 
party agreement, although Madhav Nepal faced a to-
ken challenge.157 
Drafting a new constitution is necessarily an involved 
legal exercise and the thematic committees will have 
to grapple with complex issues. But the primary 
challenge is as much political as technical. If the 
major parties are so determined, they can produce a 
reasonable draft quickly. This would require 
agreement on how to manage the small proportion of 
articles that will be highly controversial (mainly 
around federalism and the shape of 
parliamentary/presidential government and electoral 
systems). If that threshold can be crossed, the 
experience of the interim constitution drafting 
committee demonstrates that a team of experienced 
drafters can translate the content of a high-level 
political deal into appropriate legalese with admirable 
promptness.158 
There are, however, two significant challenges. First, 
any party, no matter how small, can delay the process. 
The procedural rules require unanimous approval of 
every article in the first instance; failing this, a poten-
tially time-consuming period of party consultations and 
a fresh vote, with a two-thirds quorum and two-thirds 
majority requirement, is mandated. The larger parties 
can singly (in the case of the UCPN(M), which com-
mands over one third of CA seats) or jointly (NC and 
UML159) veto any article or simply stall the process by 
boycotting the assembly and leaving it without a quorum. 
Second, and more importantly, a constitution pro-
duced by a last-minute fudge by party leaders may 
meet the deadline and be technically sound but is 
unlikely to be publicly credible or durable. The his-
torical precedent is not encouraging: Nepal’s longest-
lived constitution, the 1962 Panchayat statute, lasted 
28 years but despite being protected by authoritarian 
monarchical rule still had to undergo significant revi-
sion following a 1980 referendum; the 1990 constitu-
tion, hailed by its drafters as the best in the world, had 
in effect collapsed after Gyanendra’s dismissal of the 
elected government in October 2002, even before its 
formal replacement with the January 2007 interim 
 
 
157 Apart from the fourteen constitutional committees, the 
CA has established ten committees to serve the assembly in 
its legislative function. 
158 On the work of the interim constitution drafting committee 
see Crisis Group report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit. 
159 Any other blocking combination would require the par-
ticipation of at least four parties and probably more. (The 
tight arithmetic depends on five pending by-elections and the 
question of whether the 26 nominated members would vote 
along party lines). 
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constitution.160 Madhav Nepal himself has cited the 
1990 constitutional process as a positive demonstra-
tion of prompt drafting but it would be unwise to for-
get the short lifespan of the statute produced.161 
Shaping a constitution that can win popular accep-
tance and stand the test of time will require public 
participation, consultation and transparency of debate. 
In particular, this calls for a solid framework within 
which to discuss ethnic and regional demands, which 
are the most obvious potential flashpoints for future 
challenges or rejection. No matter how near perfec-
tion the document approaches, any constitution will 
need to embody reasonable means for future adjust-
ments and revision. The outcome of state restructur-
ing cannot be subject to constant questioning but 
equally cannot be seen as being set in stone forever. 
Social, economic and political change means revisit-
ing some decisions is inevitable. Building a broadly 
credible statute will also mean making concrete pro-
gress in areas such as inclusiveness, for example by 
ensuring the ground-breaking one-third representation 
of women in the CA is more than just a cosmetic 
achievement.162 
Some work in these areas has started. For example, 
despite the delay in appointing chairpersons, the CA’s 
constitutional and minority rights committees have 
taken out front-page newspaper advertisements call-
ing for public input; the civil relations committee set 
up postboxes for the public to deposit suggestions. 
Teams of CA members are planning to travel across 
the country for direct consultations with local com-
munities. Donors are keen to help. The UNDP has a 
body of expertise and other resources on hand; other 
agencies are pursuing individual efforts. Often these 
are overlapping: it is for the CA itself to ensure a de-
gree of coordination and a setting of priorities for in-
ternational support. The initial steps by separate 
committees have already prompted the chair of the 
public opinion and coordination committee to com-
plain that it alone should be managing the consulta-
tion process, prompting the CA speaker to intervene 
 
 
160 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting 
Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005. 
161 “Maoists must handover arms to NA: MK Nepal”, ekan-
tipur.com, 16 January 2009. 
162 Apart from longer term constitutional considerations, the 
provisions on women’s participation in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding set out by UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1325 establish a framework for immediate action. There 
has been much civil society and donor mobilisation in sup-
port of UNSCR 1325 objectives in Nepal and the UN has 
established a database to map related projects, at www.un. 
org.np/unscr/. A forthcoming Crisis Group report will exam-
ine progress to date and policy priorities in this area. 
and establish a task force to delineate jurisdictions. 
Until the CA sorts out its own approach, a well-
planned process is unlikely. 
D. JUSTICE 
The pursuit of peace in post-conflict transitions some-
times calls for justice to be deferred. In the case of 
Nepal, however, the continuing failure to take serious 
steps to end impunity and investigate war crimes is 
more the result of the politics of convenience. There 
has been movement on the establishment of a com-
mission on enforced disappearances; likewise, work 
to produce more widely acceptable legislation for a 
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) is pro-
ceeding. However, there are serious questions over 
the government’s intent.  
The cabinet approved the draft disappearance bill on 
19 November 2008 but it, and the TRC bill, were not 
put before the CA in time to be considered during the 
budget session. Plans to institute them as ordinances, 
bypassing parliamentary scrutiny, prompted serious 
concern in the human rights community.163 Neverthe-
less, the government went ahead, and an ordinance on 
disappearances was among three signed into law by 
President Ram Baran Yadav on 10 February 2009. In-
ternationally, there have been quiet measures to debar 
Nepalese Army officers accused of serious violations 
from senior UN posts, peacekeeping missions and 
military training offered by other states. At a 2 Febru-
ary 2009 hearing on writ petitions filed in August 
2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Nepal Police to 
proceed with investigations into the disappearances of 
five students in Dhanusha District in October 2003.164 
 
 
163 Noting that a similar resort to ordinances had been at-
tempted before, an umbrella group of respected activists 
warned of “the ill-intention of the government to institution-
alize the culture of impunity”: “The deliberate attempt of the 
government to undermine the rights of the people’s represen-
tatives while drafting such historically significant laws, 
which are related to overarching issues of victim’s rights to 
justice and ending the pervasive impunity in the country, is 
downright undemocratic”. “Introducing legislation via ordi-
nances: an undemocratic step”, Accountability Watch Com-
mittee press statement , Kathmandu, 22 January 2009. 
164 The police had refused to register first information reports 
on these cases naming senior civil, police and military offi-
cials and had not requested forensic assistance to conduct 
exhumations at a suspected burial site. In January 2008, the 
NHRC had recommended a full investigation and compensa-
tion to the families. OHCHR-Nepal called on the govern-
ment to take immediate steps to implement this and other 
Supreme Court decisions “to ensure that the perpetrators of 
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However, there has been no action on the most shock-
ing abuses committed during the conflict and after the 
start of the peace process. In the most high-profile in-
dividual case, the torture and killing of fifteen-year-
old Maina Sunuwar by army officers in 2004, the state 
still appears unable or unwilling to pursue investiga-
tions, despite promises to support police enquiries.165 
Despite the acknowledgement of “mistakes” during 
the people’s war and beyond, the Maoists continue to 
shelter the individuals responsible for atrocities, most 
prominently PLA commander Kali Bahadur Kham 
Magar “Bibidh”. Accused of overseeing the abduction, 
torture and murder of businessman Ram Hari Shrestha, 
he has not only been sheltered by the party but rein-
stated to its central committee.166 Needless to say, 
these acts of omission and commission directly con-
travene the explicit commitments made in the CPA.167 
 
 
the Dhanusha disappearances, as well as other serious con-
flict-related human rights violations, are brought to justice.” 
“OHCHR-Nepal calls for swift implementation of Supreme 
Court ruling on Dhanusha disappearance”, OHCHR-Nepal, 
press release, 5 February 2009. 
165 On the fifth anniversary of Maina’s death, OHCHR-
Nepal noted: “Despite a September 2007 Supreme Court rul-
ing that police conduct an investigation and years of advo-
cacy by the human rights community, the alleged perpetrators 
have yet to be brought to justice. The lack of progress in the 
case of Maina Sunuwar is emblematic of the overall lack of 
accountability for human rights violations which occurred 
both during and after the conflict in Nepal between 1996 and 
2006”. “Impunity remains major obstacle to the peace proc-
ess”, OHCHR-Nepal, press release, 16 February 2009. 
166 “Ram Hari murder accused gets Maoist CC berth”, myre-
publica.com, 15 January 2009. The UN has expressed con-
cern that six months after five persons were charged in 
relation to the disappearance and killing of Ram Hari 
Shrestha only one individual has been arrested, police’s let-
ters to the PLA requesting an interview with 3rd Division 
Commander Kali Bahadur Kham (‘Bibidh’) have not been 
answered and local Maoist leaders had not cooperated with 
Chitwan Police to enable them to carry out their investiga-
tion and arrest those charged. The probe commission report 
submitted to the government on 16 July 2008 has not been 
published. “OHCHR-Nepal urges Home Minister to ensure 
accountability for killing of Ram Hari Shrestha”, OHCHR-
Nepal, press release, 29 December 2008. The main accused, 
Govinda Bahadur Batala, is in police custody but Shrestha’s 
family continue to call for action against Bibidh, who was 
reportedly indicted by the July 2008 commission. “SC up-
holds Apex Court decision to detain Batala”, ekantipur.com, 
15 February 2009.  
167 For example, “Both sides agree to make public within 60 
days of the signing of the agreement the correct and full 
names and addresses of the people who ‘disappeared’ or 
were killed during the conflict and convey such details to the 
family members”. CPA, Art. 5.2.3. “Both sides express their 
commitment that impartial investigation shall be carried out 
Party leaders and security chiefs have a shared inter-
est in resisting pressure to investigate or prosecute. 
Victims’ voices are rarely heard, except when there is 
political advantage to be gained from highlighting 
their plight – such as when army chief Katwal pub-
licly received a petition from victims of the Maoists. 
Given the chronic inadequacy of national justice 
mechanisms, serious investigations or prosecutions 
are a remote possibility. Deferring trials in the inter-
ests of reconciliation and peacebuilding is not inher-
ently wrong, if there is a compelling case that 
proceeding immediately would threaten the peace 
process. But those accused of the gravest crimes can 
still feel untouchable. 
 
 
and lawful action would be taken against individuals respon-
sible for obstructions in the exercise of the rights contained 
in the agreement and guarantee not to encourage impunity. 
Apart from this, they shall also guarantee the right to relief 
of the families of victims of conflict, torture and disappear-
ance”. CPA, Art. 7.1.3. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s peace process faces difficult days. Precedent 
suggests political leaders can rally round to avert cri-
ses at the last minute; there are some signs that they 
have recognised the risks of a breakdown and pulled 
back from more intense confrontation. But complet-
ing the peace and constitutional processes in a way 
which leaves lasting stability requires more than an-
other round of short-term fixes, fictitious deadlines 
and half thought-out trade-offs between parties’ short-
term interests. 
It is time to face up to some inconvenient truths. The 
peace process has rested uncomfortably, and at times 
precariously, on several mutually convenient fictions. 
The most obvious is the repeated pretence that rapid 
PLA integration would remove the need for a UN 
role: UNMIN has now had three six-month extensions 
following the expiry of its original one-year mandate 
in January 2008 and the latest term looks just as 
unlikely to be met. Most peace process deadlines, 
voluntarily set by the parties, have been unrealistic, 
such as the Maoist promise to return all property 
within fifteen days. Taking part in one election and 
leading a government has not in itself democratised 
the Maoists, nor can the rhetoric of “new Nepal” dis-
guise the unreconstructed weaknesses of their politi-
cal opponents. More seriously, the consensus at the 
heart of the process has been at least overstated, and 
at times close to imaginary. In reality, very different 
interests and positions remain to be bridged – a task 
that is possible but that cannot be wished away with 
overoptimistic language. 
Addressing these challenges is the job of Nepal’s 
leaders. But the international community must recog-
nise the fragility of the process and be prepared to 
stick with it. A successfully completed peace process 
could have broad positive effects for the Nepalese 
people and for the region. Successful elections do not 
in themselves mean a return to normal development 
engagement. Instead, the need is for carefully targeted 
assistance and political pressure. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 19 February 2009
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
AISC Army Integration Special Committee 
AMMAA Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, December 2006 
APF Armed Police Force 
CA Constituent Assembly 
COAS Chief of Army Staff 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement, November 2006 
CPI(Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), now UCPN(M) 
HLPC High-Level Peace Commission 
JMCC Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee 
LPC Local Peace Committee 
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (sometimes referred to in other sources as the Madhesi People’s Rights 
Forum, MPRF) 
MoPR Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 
NA Nepalese Army 
NC Nepali Congress 
NHRC National Human Rights Commission 
NSC National Security Council 
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (referred to in UN documents and agreements such as the AMMAA and 
December 2007 23-point agreement as “Maoist army”) 
RJP Rashtriya Janashakti Party 
RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
RPP(N) Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal) 
SRSG Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General 
TMDP Tarai Madhes Democratic Party 
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
UCPN(M) United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
UDMF United Democratic Madhesi Front 
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 
YCL Young Communist League 
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with 
some 130 staff members on five continents, working 
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to 
prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of 
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg-
ular update on the state of play in all the most significant 
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and made available simultaneously on the 
website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely 
with governments and those who influence them, 
including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to 
generate support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of 
senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is 
co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for 
External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief 
Executive since January 2000 has been former Austral-
ian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it 
is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one 
in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. 
The organisation currently operates ten regional offices (in 
Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, 
Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local field 
representation in seventeen additional locations 
(Abuja, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damas-
cus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Oua-
gadougou, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Tehran). 
Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or 
potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this 
includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, 
Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; in 
the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf 
States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen ; and in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela. 
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol-
lowing governmental departments and agencies currently 
provide funding: Australian Agency for International De-
velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development 
Agency, Canadian International Development and Re-
search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan-
ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign 
Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for 
International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab 
Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, United 
Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. 
Agency for International Development.  
Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual 
support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing 
the Future Fund, include the Better World Fund, Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, William & Flora Hewlett Foun-
dation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish 
World Watch, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, 
John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open 
Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Radcliffe 
Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund and VIVA Trust. 
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Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 
February 2006 (also available in Russian) 
Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report 
N°113, 10 April 2006 
Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, 
16 August 2006 (also available in Russian) 
Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 
6 November 2006 
Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 
(also available in Russian) 
Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007 
Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 
(also available in Russian) 
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